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JURY NULLIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS AS
STRUCTURAL ERROR
Susan Yorke*
Abstract: Jury nullification is a legal problem child. Aberrant but built into the
Constitution, rebellious but merciful, lawless but often just, it defies easy categorization.
Courts have been reluctant to discuss this unruly character, preferring that it remain in the
shadows. When federal and state laws diverge, however, the problem of nullification rears its
head, sometimes prompting courts to undertake the delicate task of talking about the
unmentionable. This Article examines what courts can say about nullification and what
should happen on appeal if they say too much.
It is a basic tenet of criminal procedure that a trial court cannot direct a guilty verdict or
p ni h j ror for failing o re rn one, regardle of he reng h of he pro ec ion ca e. Ye
when trial courts threaten juries with such improper punishment or suggest that juries lack the
power to acquit, appellate courts have been loath to reverse the resulting convictions. Although
some courts have acknowledged that such coercive anti-nullification instructions amount to
constitutional error, they have subjected those errors to harmless error review. In doing so,
courts have tended to downplay the significance of the error and focus on the strength of the
pro ec ion ca e, re l ing in circ lar rea oning ha render el i e an remed for he
violation.
But coercive anti-nullification instructional error is uniquely ill-suited to harmless error
anal i . U ing he S preme Co r recen clarifica ion of he r c ral error doc rine in
Weaver v. Massachusetts and building upon the emerging scholarly recognition of the jurytrial right as primarily institutional, this Article argues that coercive anti-nullification
in r c ion a i f all hree of he S preme Co r ra ionale for r c ral error. Fir , he
jury-trial right implicated by the error protects institutional and community interests rather than
he defendan in ere in a oiding erroneous conviction. Second, the unique nature of
nullification means that the error defies traditional approaches to measuring its effect on the
verdict. And third, because the error does violence to some of the central purposes of trial by
jury, it always results in fundamental unfairness. Error resulting from coercive antinullification instructions is therefore structural and should result in automatic reversal.

* Teaching Fellow, Ninth Circuit Practicum, University of California, Berkeley School of Law. J.D.,
Columbia Law School; M.P.A., Princeton University; B.A., Williams College. Many thanks to Laura
Appleman, Jenny Carroll, Jason Iuliano, Justin McCrary, Gillian Metzger, and Michael Yu, among
others, for their thoughtful input.
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INTRODUCTION
Picture this: The federal government charges a defendant with
distributing marijuana. The evidence of guilt is seemingly irrefutable
there are numerous witnesses and a paper trail that runs for miles. Seems
like a surefire conviction, right? But now add a wrinkle. The state in which
the defendant lives and operates and from which the jury will be
drawn has legalized marijuana, and the defendant has at least arguably
been operating in compliance with state law.1
If this wrinkle gives you pause as to whether the federal government
will obtain a conviction, the reason is probably jury nullification. A jury
from a state that, by the will of its people, has chosen to legalize marijuana
might be more likely to return an acquittal. And it might do so despite
1. This is not just a hypothetical it happened in two recent Ninth Circuit cases. See United States
v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1066 69 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1025
27 (9th Cir. 2017).
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irrefutable evidence that the defendant has violated federal law as
explained to the jury by the judge. In other words, the jury might well
simply disregard the law because it does not agree with it.
A jury indisputably has the power to nullify that is, the power to
di regard he j dge in r c ion on he la and re rn an acq i al
despite clear evidence of guilt.2 But the case law is clear that a criminal
defendant has no right to have a jury instructed on that power.3 Moreover,
juries can be admonished that they must follow the law, and such
admonishments can be strong ones up to a point.4
It is clear that a judge cannot punish a jury for returning an acquittal
that belies the law and evidence, nor can the court direct a verdict of
guilty.5 And, at least in some jurisdictions, a judge cannot instruct jurors
that they lack the power to nullify or imply that they might be penalized
for doing so.6 Although the rule that judges cannot mislead juries or
threaten them with punishment if they are perceived to have disregarded
the law would appear to be a sensible one, it has proved to be rather
toothless, even in the courts in which it is recognized.7
That toothlessness derives in large part from the fact that courts have
concluded that misinforming or threatening a jury about its power to
acquit does not amount to structural error.8 Instead, courts have subjected
such errors to harmless error analysis an analysis that is intrinsically
problematic when one concedes, as one generally must in this context,
that the evidence presented was strong enough (indeed, often
overwhelmingly so) to sustain a conviction.9
The structural error doctrine is of relatively recent vintage, and its
precise contours have been difficult to define.10 In its 2017 decision in
2. THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200 1800, at xiii (1985); see also infra section I.A.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105 06 (11 h Cir. 1983) ( [C]o r . . . have
almost uniformly held that a criminal defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction which points up
the existence of [jury nullifica ion]. ); see also infra section I.B.
4. See Merced v. McGrath, 426 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Thomas, 116
F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1997).
5. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920); Thomas, 116 F.3d at 615; Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986).
6. See Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1032; State v. Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d 485, 507 (Kan. 2014).
7. See United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1089 (9th Cir. 2018) (Watford, J., dissenting);
Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1032.
8. See Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1033 34; Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d at 507.
9. Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1031 36; Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d at 490 92; see also infra Part III.
10. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional Significance of the
Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2027, 2038 39 (2008); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless
Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 82 83 (1988); see also infra Part II.
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Weaver v. Massachusetts,11 however, the Supreme Court clarified the
rationales for classifying certain errors as structural, identifying three
categories of structural error.12 First, an error may be structural if the right
at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous
conviction.13 Second, an error may be structural if its effects are simply
too hard to measure.14 And third, an error may be structural if it always
results in fundamental unfairness.15
This Article argues that improperly coercive anti-nullification
instructions qualify as structural error under all three categories. First, the
right at issue trial by jury is primarily an institutional safeguard built
to protect the people from tyrannical government and to serve as a check
on unjust lawmaking and enforcement, rather than an attempt to avoid
erroneous conviction. Second, the effects of the error are uniquely
diffic l o mea re. The reng h of he pro ec ion ca e and he
correctness of the other instructions the jury received standard fare for
measuring the effect of an error on the verdict reveal little or nothing
about the actual effect of any error in this context. And third, the error
always results in fundamental unfairness in that a defendant who is
convicted by a jury that has been affirmatively misled about the scope of
its own power or fears government reprisal cannot be said to have received
a fair trial. Such errors do violence to the institution itself in ways that are
fundamentally unfair to the public as a whole.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief description of
jury nullification and a summary of the current state of the law related to
instructions about nullification. Part II discusses the evolution of
constitutional harmless error analysis and its counterpart, structural error,
c lmina ing in he S preme Co r deci ion in Weaver. Part III argues
that coercive anti-nullification instructions satisfy not just one, but all
three, of Weaver s categories of structural error. Finally, Part IV considers
some of the potential analytical and public policy objections to classifying
coercive anti-nullification instructions as structural error.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

__ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017).
Id. at 1908.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The erm j r n llifica ion, a i mo ba ic, in ol e a j r
rejection of the governing law in order to return an acquittal in a criminal
case.16 Despite clear evidence that the defendant committed the alleged
act and clear instructions that the alleged act constitutes a crime, the jury
nonetheless refuses to convict.17
A j r
deci ion o n llif can ari e o of e eral differen
con idera ion . In i p re form, j r n llifica ion occ r
hen he j r
recognizes that a defendan ac i pro cribed b he la b acq i
beca e i doe no belie e he ac ho ld be pro cribed. 18 For example,
in mid-nineteenth century Utah, juries often refused to indict or convict
defendants for the newly-established federal crime of polygamy a
practice that religious leader Brigham Young had endorsed only a decade
earlier.19 Many Mormon jurors believed that the law proscribing
polygamy was both unconstitutional and morally wrong.20 In accordance
with those beliefs and in contravention of the applicable law and
evidence presented they either refused to indict or delivered acquittals.21
A more modern example would be the one from the introduction: a jury
in a state that has legalized marijuana acquits a defendant of federal drug
crimes despite clear evidence that he has distributed marijuana in
contravention of federal law.22 Bo h of he e e ample con i e cla ic
or core n llifica ion.23
An intermediate form of nullification occurs when the jury believes that
16. Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149, 1150
(1997).
17. GREEN, supra note 2, at xiii.
18. Id. at xviii.
19. Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1133, 1188 89 (2011).
20. Id. a 1190 ( Mormon con idered he h mani arian claim [again pol gam ] ab rd. To hem,
polygamy was not only ordained by God by also endorsed by women. . . . Instead of humanitarianism,
Mormons thought the central issues were constitutional questions, chiefly concerning federalism but
also concerning freedom of religion. They insisted that they had the constitutional right to structure
heir dome ic rela ion like marriage ho e er he U ah majori a fi . ).
21. Id. at 1189.
22. See United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1089 (9th Cir. 2018) (Watford, J., dissenting)
(e plaining ha , in a federal pro ec ion for marij ana di rib ion, nullification was an obvious
po ibili gi en he pop lari of medical marij ana in California ).
23. See Bressler, supra note 19, at 1189.
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the act at issue should indeed be criminalized but disagrees with the
prescribed punishment.24 In other words, when a jury considers the
punishment for a particular act to be excessive, it may refuse to convict at
all in order to prevent the imposition of that punishment.25 This type of
nullification may arise in the context of crimes that carry with them widely
known and severe mandatory minimum sentences, such as some drug
crimes or firearm enhancements.26 A historical example is the tendency of
juries to acquit defendants of capital offenses when those crimes were
subject to a mandatory death penalty.27
Finally, in its most attenuated form, nullification can occur when a jury
agrees both that the act at issue should be criminal and that it should
generally be punished as prescribed, but the jury opposes punishment
under the particular circumstances presented.28 This type of ad hoc
nullification can spring from a variety of motivations sympathy for a
particular defendant, a desire for leniency for acts committed under dire
circumstances, fear of repri al from a defendan famil or poli ical
connections, or prejudice against the victim.29 Defendants who steal to
feed their families or euthanize suffering family members at their request
might well be candidates for merciful acquittal under this type of
nullification.30 More problematic examples abound, including the refusal
of all-white juries to indict or convict white defendants accused of
assaulting or murdering people of color.31
What all forms of jury nullification have in common is a refusal simply
24. GREEN, supra note 2, at xviii.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Adriaan Lanni, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come
(Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1782 83 (1999) (di c ing he endenc of j ror o n llif in he
face of widely-kno n de ermina e en encing a e ). J rie picall are not instructed on the
punishments that might result from particular convictions. See Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant
After All? A Prescription for Informing Juries of the Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. REV.
2223, 2237 (2010).
27. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 & n.29 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 297 98 (1972); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971); see also George Fisher, The
Jury s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 602 & n.83 (1997) (pro iding e ample of j rie
hi orical endenc o emper he la
e eri , e en in he face of clear e idence of g il ).
28. GREEN, supra note 2, at xviii.
29. Id. at xviii xx.
30. See Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury Nullification,
48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 169, 170 n.19 (1991); Brown, supra note 16, at 1183 84, 1189 91.
31. See Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Deliberation, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 138 (1998);
Bressler, supra note 19, at 1183 84. For a discussion of the ways in which communities might
leverage jury nullification to challenge racial bias in the criminal justice system, see Paul Butler,
Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677
(1995).

Yorke (Do Not Delete)

2020]

10/5/2020 3:54 PM

JURY NULLIFICATION AND STRUCTURAL ERROR

1447

to apply the law to the facts of the case and accept the verdict that reveals
itself through that process.32 Nullification indicates that something in the
system is unbalanced. The law itself is out of step with the community, a
pro ec or di cre ionar deci ion o charge a par ic lar defendan failed
to account for the sympathetic circumstances of the case, or prejudice has
rendered justice unavailable to a particular class of victims. Particularly
in its core form, nullification is a proverbial canary in the judicial coal
mine, a symptom of profound misalignment between lawmakers and
the community.
Much has been said and little agreement has been reached about
whether nullification is good or bad, and he an er of en depend on
the context.33 To man , n llifica ion in ol e an abdica ion of he j r
traditional role.34 By disregarding the law to act in accordance with
conscience, the jury usurps the powers of the legislature and of the
judiciary, claiming for itself momentary power over the law.35 Because
nullification subverts what some see as wholly separate roles the
legislature determines the law, the judge instructs on the law, and the jury
finds the facts nullification is often described as lawless or
anarchic behavior.36
Viewed differently, however, nullification is an essential part of the
jury trial right.37 As discussed in greater detail below, a significant aspect
of o r na ion a achmen o j r rial i he idea ha j ries act as the
oice of he comm ni , e en (or perhap e peciall ) hen comm ni
mores differ from the applicable laws.38 That particular role has little or

32. Brown, supra note 16, at 1151 & n.8.
33. See id. at 1149 53 (describing the long-running debate and collecting scholarship); Jenny E.
Carroll, The Jury s Second Coming, 100 GEO. L.J. 657, 659 (2012).
34. Brown, supra note 16, at 1150 52; Carroll, supra note 33, at 659.
35. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 71 (1895). The jury once had the explicit right to decide
questions of law, but that power was eroded over a series of decisions during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Brown, supra note 16, at 1160; Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right
to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168, 174 77 (1972); Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal
Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939); Carroll, supra note 33, at 659.
36. Brown, supra note 16, at 1151 n.7; see also United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 20
(9th Cir. 1972) (quoting statement from Justice Fortas and Judge Rifkind describing jury nullification
a an a ack pon he la
and ha i o ld lead o a ocie
i ho la ); Uni ed S a e .
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (de cribing n llifica ion a he happening of
he la le j r ); People . Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726 n.39 (Cal. 1983) (no ing that nullification is
akin to anarchy).
37. See Fisher, supra note 27, at 581 82 ( [N]o only do juries manifestly make law witness the
repeated refusals of Michigan juries to convict Jack Kevorkian of assisting suicide but many
ob er er regard heir po er o do o a a f ndamen al par of o r rial
em. ).
38. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059; see also infra Part III.
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nothing to do with objective factfinding and faithful application of the law
and everything to do with acting as a moral check on government
authority.39 Juries exercise that unique function through their power to
nullify, which is built into the Constitution through the operation of the
jury-trial right, the venue clause, and the prohibition on double jeopardy.40
The jury trial right combined i h he en e cla e manda e ha he
j r be dra n from he defendan
locale ensures community
participation.41 And the Double Jeopardy Clause insulates the
comm ni
e erci e of lenienc b prohibi ing retrial or appeal by the
government following an acquittal, in essence creating space for
nullification to occur and shielding it from judicial review.42 Accordingly,
many scholars view nullification not as errant but as the exercise of a
constitutionally protected power that is an essential part of our system
of governance.43
Nullification thus simultaneously occupies dissonant roles in our
jurisprudential universe.44 It is anarchy, subverting the most basic tenets
of our adjudicative process. And it is itself a fundamental tenet of that
process, instilling in the people the power to resist government tyranny
39. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569
70 (1977).
40. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2053; see also Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 569 70
(indicating the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to protect the citizen from the sovereign);
Uni ed S a e . Thoma , 116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1997) ( [T]he er in i ion of rial b j r in
a criminal ca e, a J dge Learned Hand ob er ed, in rod ce a lack in o he enforcement of law,
empering i rigor b he mollif ing infl ence of c rren e hical con en ion . . . . [S]everal features
of o r j r rial
em ac o pro ec he j r po er o acq i , regardle of he e idence, hen he
pro ec ion ca e mee
i h he j r
moral[] di appro [al]. ).
41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ( The Trial of all Crime , e cep in Ca e of Impeachmen , hall
be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed . . . . ); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ( In all criminal pro ec ion , he acc ed hall enjo he
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . . ); see also Thomas, 116 F.3d at 615 (discussing the unique features of the
jury trial system); LAURA I. APPLEMAN, DEFENDING THE JURY: CRIME, COMMUNITY, AND THE
CONSTITUTION 13 38 (2015) (discussing the evolution of the jury trial system).
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ( [N]or hall an per on be bjec for he ame offen e o be ice
p in jeopard of life or limb. ); see also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975)
(explaining that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes a general bar on government appeals following
an acquittal by jury).
43. See Scheflin, supra note 35, at 170; see also United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 519 n.11
(9 h Cir. 1972) (no ing ha he acq i al of William Penn and John Pe er Zenger ill ra e ho
ell
o r ocie
in ere ha e been er ed b acq i al re l ing from applica ion b he j ror of heir
collective con cience and en e of j ice ).
44. See Stacey P. Eilbaum, Note, The Dual Face of the American Jury: The Antiauthoritarian and
Antimajoritarian Hero and Villain in American Law and Legal Scholarship, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
711, 721 (2013) ( The S preme Co r and lo er federal co r no onl hail he j r a a ba ion of
liber , he al o deride i a a eed of anarch . ).
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and prevent injustice. Law values order; nullification is mayhem. But it is
mayhem that was purposefully built into the system. Needless to say, this
duality makes talking about nullification a bit dicey, particularly for
the courts.
B.

What Trial Courts Can Talk About When They Talk About
Nullification

The benefits and dangers of nullification are real. To a defendant facing
a long sentence for committing an act whose criminality is unpopular,
nullification may be a lone ray of hope. To a judge concerned with
preserving the integrity of the legal system, nullification may appear to
pose an existential threat to both the legislative and adjudicative
processes.45 To a community, nullification can vindicate its highest values
or reflect its deepest prejudices. And when nullification does occur, it can
be difficult to identify with certainty and, in any event, is unreviewable by
any appellate court.46
The chimerical nature of nullification makes it difficult to pin down,
and its unusual status in our constitutional framework renders it elusive.
It should, therefore, come as no great surprise that much of the
jurisprudence concerning nullification has been less about the thing itself
than about what can or cannot be said about it.
1.

The Power That Dare Not Speak Its Name

The debate about whether jurors should be affirmatively instructed
about their power to nullify, although largely settled in the courts, remains
contentious among activists, academics, and even some federal judges.47
45. See, e.g., Sparf v. United S a e , 156 U.S. 51, 71 (1895) ( If a pe i j r can righ f ll e erci e
this power over one statute of [C]ongress, they must have an equal right and power over any other
statute, and indeed over all the statutes; for no line can be drawn, no restriction imposed, on the
exercise of such power; it must rest in discretion only. If this power be once admitted, petit jurors will
be perior o he na ional legi la re, and i la
ill be bjec o heir con rol. (q o ing Uni ed
States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 256 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709))); see also id. a 101 ( P blic
and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle be established that juries in criminal cases
may, of right, disregard the law as expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto
hem el e . ).
46. Because jurors have in irrefutable right to decide the facts of the case, it is often difficult to say
with absolute clarity that an acquittal resulted from nullification rather than reasonable doubt about
some element of the crime. See id. a 91 ( hen a j r i e a general erdic of acq i al, i co ld
never be proved, where the case went to the jury upon both law and facts, that the jurors did not
proceed pon heir ie of he e idence ); Bro n, supra note 16, at 1152 n.8.
47. Indeed, a grassroots movement to inform potential jurors of their power to nullify has been
ongoing for some time. See About FIJA, FULLY INFORMED JURY ASS N, https://fija.org/aboutfija/overview.html [https://perma.cc/8E3D-EZKS]; see also Celeste Headlee, Jury Nullification:
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Because this Article is concerned primarily with the issue of antinullification instructions and, in particular, with how to classify errors
arising from them it will touch on the question of affirmative
nullification instructions only briefly. The main takeaway is that, at the
present moment, instructions that affirmatively inform the jury of its
power to nullify are certainly not required and are distinctly disfavored.48
This result was by no means a foregone conclusion. Until the end of
the nineteenth century, courts and lawmakers vigorously debated whether
the jury had the right to decide not only questions of fact but also questions
of law.49 In many colonies, the practice around the time of the founding
a ha j rie decided bo h la and fac , hile he rial j dge role a
merel o pre er e order. 50 After the adoption of the Constitution, juries
continued to play an active role as arbiters of both law and fact.51 Judges
often instructed juries about their independence to determine for
themselves the ultimate questions presented by the case.52 During this
period, he concep of he j r a one of he people mo e en ial
vanguards against political oppression continued as an underlying

Acquitting
Based
on
Principle,
NAT L
PUB.
RADIO
(Nov.
4,
2013),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=242990498 [https://perma.cc/WP2H-222K].
Academic debate also continues, including a resurgence of originalist arguments that nullification
should be viewed as an integral part of the jury trial right. See Bressler, supra note 19, at 1135; see
also Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 30, at 165 66 (collecting academic perspectives on both sides
of the debate); Richard St. John, Note, License to Nullify: The Democratic and Constitutional
Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 YALE L.J. 2563 (1997) (collecting academic
arguments in favor of affirmative instruction on nullification). Even some federal judges have joined
the fray, providing or advocating for affirmative instructions on nullification. Bressler, supra note 19,
at 1140 41. And some states have made efforts to pass legislation requiring jurors to be instructed on
their power to nullify. See S.B. 924, 79th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2017); H.B. 133, 2017 Sess.
(N.H. 2017); H.B. 332, 2017 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133 37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ( Thi o-called
right of jury nullification is put forward in the name of liberty and democracy, but its explicit avowal
risks the ultimate logic of anarchy. . . . This requirement of independent jury conception confines the
happening of the lawless jury to the occasional instance that does not violate, and viewed as an
exception may even enhance, the over-all normative effect of the rule of law. An explicit instruction
to a jury conveys an implied approval that runs the risk of degrading the legal structure requisite for
r e freedom, for an ordered liber ha pro ec again anarch a ell a
rann . ); People .
Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 726 n.39 (Cal. 1983) (affirma i e in r c ion on j r n llifica ion ma achie e
pragmatic justice in i ola ed in ance , b
e gge he more likel re l i anarch ); see also
United States v. González-Pérez, 778 F.3d 3, 18 19 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Trujillo, 714
F.2d 102, 105 06 (11th Cir. 1983).
49. See Howe, supra note 35, at 590 96.
50. Id. at 591.
51. Scheflin, supra note 35, at 175 76.
52. Id.
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principle in he American j dicial
em. 53 But the tide began to shift in
the mid-1800 , c lmina ing in he S preme Co r 1895 decision in Sparf
v. United States.54 Sparf put an end to the period of complete jury
independence. There the Court held that a defendant has no right to have
the jury instructed on a lesser offense where the evidence would not
rationally support a conviction for the lesser, but not the greater, offense.55
In so holding, the Court observed that, while the jury has the right to
decide the facts, it has no such right to decide the law.56 Ra her, [i] i he
duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law, and it is the duty of the
jury to follow the la a i i laid do n b he co r . 57
In Sparf, the Court focused on the threat posed to society and, in
particular, to criminal defendants if juries were allowed to decide for
themselves what the law was.58 What, the Court wondered, would become
of us if juries could convict defendants based on their own irrational,
uninformed, or biased view of the law?59 Nothing good, the Court
ultimately concluded, so it must be that juries have no right to decide
questions of law.60
De pi e he Co r foc on he risks to criminal defendants if juries
were allowed to decide questions of law, Sparf itself involved the denial
of a defendan req e for an in r c ion on le er crime .61 In holding
that the defendant had no right to such an instruction, the Court had to turn
its proposition that defendants have the right to be convicted only of
crimes controlled b
e led, fi ed, legal principle
on its head,
extrapolating that defendants concomitantly have no right to be acquitted
in contravention of those principles.62 In other words, because a jury has
no right to convict based on its own view of the law, it also lacks any right
to acquit on a more serious offense while convicting of a lesser offense
where the evidence supports no such distinction.63 The Court reasoned
53. Id. at 175.
54. 156 U.S. 51 (1895).
55. Id. at 106.
56. Id. at 71 74 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 74 (quoting United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835)
(No. 14,545)).
58. See id. (quoting Battiste, 24 F. Cas. at 1043).
59. Id. at 71, 74 (quoting United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 256 (C.C.D. Va. 1800)
(No. 14,709)).
60. Id. at 74, 101; see also Brown, supra note 16, at 1150 (e plaining ha j r n llifica ion i
di fa ored in large par beca e i eem o ndermine he r le of la ).
61. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 59, 99.
62. Id. at 101 03.
63. Id.
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that a jury who chose to convict for one of those lesser crimes rather than
the greater one where no evidence supported the distinction would
necessarily be disregarding the law.64 Because the jury had no right to do
so, the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on lesser
included offenses.65
The majority in Sparf did ackno ledge he j r
inheren po er o
66
acquit in the teeth of the law. But it seemed to view that power as a
dangerous anomaly rather than as an integral part of the adjudicative
system.67 That view drew a strong dissent, which focused on the idea that
the jury trial right exists in large part to protect defendants from autocratic
governments, which might impose unjust laws.68 The dissent explained
that the existence of jury trials allo
he people o ake par in e er
conviction of a person accused of crime by the government; and the
general knowledge that no man can be otherwise convicted increases
public confidence in the justice of convictions, and is a strong bulwark of
the admini ra ion of he criminal la . 69 The dissent argued that this
in ere ga e he j r
he ndo b ed and ncon rollable po er o
determine for themselves the law as well as the fact by a general verdict
of acq i al. 70
Sparf and its progeny established, among other things, that although a
jury has the power to nullify, there is no freestanding nullification right.71
Consistent with that understanding, a defendant has no right to an

64. Id. at 99 100.
65. Id. at 103. Later decisions have recognized that allowing a jury to convict on lesser included
offen e can be beneficial o he defendan beca e i afford he j r a le dra ic al erna i e han
he choice be een con ic ion of he offen e charged and acq i al. Beck . Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,
633 (1980). That latitude encourages the jury to strictly apply the reasonable doubt standard, and the
Supreme Court has rejected the idea that prohibiting instruction on lesser included offenses where
the evidence supports such an instruction will help prevent jury nullification. Id. at 640 41. Sparf
survives in part because it applies only in cases where no evidence supports the contention that the
defendant committed the lesser, but not the greater, offense. See Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury
Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 61 63 (1980)
(discussing the limited nature of the actual holding in Sparf).
66. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 84.
67. Id. at 101 02.
68. Id. at 110 83 (Gray, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 175.
70. Id. at 174.
71. See St. John, supra note 47, a 2563 ( Since he S preme Co r 1895 deci ion in Sparf v.
United States, it has been a commonplace understanding that criminal juries have the power but not
the right to nullify the law before them . . . . ); see also Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S.
135, 138 (1920); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 37 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Merced v.
McGrath, 426 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005).
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affirmative nullification instruction.72 Moreover, defense counsel has no
right even to make a nullification-based argument to the jury.73 Thus,
although debate over this issue and o er he correc ne of he Co r
decision in Sparf continues to rage, the present situation can be
summarized succinctly: Juries have the power to nullify, but no one dare
mention it.74
2.

Laying Down the Law About Following the Law

If a court should not affirmatively instruct juries about their power to
nullify, may it take affirmative action to dissuade them from doing so?
And if so, how far may a court go o pre en he mi chie o
con eq ence 75 of nullification?
The an er i ha co r ha e he d
o fore all or pre en
[n llifica ion], he her b firm in r c ion or admoni ion. 76 In doing so,
72. See, e.g., Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1135 36 ( The a he j r opera e ma be radicall al ered
if there is alteration in the way it is told to operate. The jury knows well enough that its prerogative
is not limited to the choices articulated in the formal instructions of the court. . . . What makes for
health as an occasional medicine would be disastrous as a daily diet. The fact that there is widespread
e i ence of he j r
preroga i e, and appro al of i e i ence a a nece ar co n er o ca ehardened judges and arbitrar pro ec or , doe no e abli h a an impera i e ha he j r m be
informed b he j dge of ha po er. ); Uni ed S a e . Tr jillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105 (11 h Cir. 1983)
( The co r ha ha e con idered he q e ion ha e almo niforml held hat a criminal defendant
is not entitled to a jury instruction which points up to the existence of that practical power [of
n llifica ion]. ).
73. See Sparf, 156 U.S. a 102 ( [W]here he ma er i not controlled by express constitutional or
statutory provisions, it cannot be regarded as the right of counsel to dispute before the jury the law as
declared b he co r . ); Uni ed S a e . Kr ke, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6 h Cir. 1988) (no ing ha
fe co r ha e e en permi ed arg men o he j r on he opic ).
74. See Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1130 37 (explaining that juries can glean from informal sources
that they have the power to nullify, and that instructing them on that power would imperil the rule of
law, unduly burden jurors, and upset the balance in which juries resort to nullification only as a safety
valve in extraordinary cases); see also United States v. Davis, 724 F.3d 949, 954 55 (7th Cir. 2013)
( Al ho gh j r n llifica ion i a na ral and a ime de irable aberra ion nder o r
em, i i no
to be positively sanctioned by instructions . . . . (q o ing Uni ed S a e . Ander on, 716 F.2d 466,
449 50 (7th Cir. 1983))); United S a e . Pere , 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7 h Cir. 1996) ( An nrea onable
jury verdict, although unreviewable if it is an acquittal, is lawless, and the defendant has no right to
in i e he j r o ac la le l . ); Uni ed S a e . Sep l eda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993)
( Tho gh j r n llifica ion ha a long and ome ime oried pa . . . the case law makes plain that a
j dge ma no in r c he j r anen i hi or , i ali , or e. (ci a ion omi ed)); Trujillo, 714
F.2d a 106 ( While e recognize that a jury may render a verdict at odds with the evidence or the
la , nei her he co r nor co n el ho ld enco rage j ror o iola e heir oa h. ); S a e . S in on,
No. 112,655, 2016 WL 3031216, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. May 27, 2016) (Atcheson, J., concurring)
( One of he parado e of j r n llifica ion lie in he ilence ha hro d i . ).
75. Sparf, 156 U.S. at 71.
76. Merced, 426 F.3d at 1079 80 (quoting Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980)); see
also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1997).
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courts can go pretty far, but there is a limit.
On one end of the spectrum, the Supreme Court has made clear that
judges can instruct the jury that it should follow the law as provided to it
by the court.77 Indeed, such instructions are uniform in federal courts and
many states.78 A co r can al o ell he j r ha i ho ld no
b i e
i en e of j ice for i d
o follo he la or decide he her a la
i j or nj . 79 Moreover, voir dire can include questions targeted at
identifying and removing would-be nullifiers, and jurors can be made to
take an oath affirming that they will follow the law.80
Courts cannot, however, punish jurors for failing to return a verdict that
the court believes is compelled by the evidence. That rule dates back to
early England and the famous Bushell s Case.81 In Bushell s Case,
Quakers William Penn and William Mead were charged with preaching
o an nla f l a embl . 82 The jury refused to return a guilty verdict,
despite the strength of the prosecution ca e.83 The judge thought that the
jury, in refusing to convict, was disregarding the law, and it punished them
for that decision, declaring:
Gentlemen, you shall not be dismissed till we have a verdict that
the court will accept; and you shall be locked up, without meat,
drink, fire, and tobacco; you shall not think thus to abuse the
court; we will have a verdict by the help of God, or you shall
starve for it.84
The jurors nonetheless returned an acquittal, whereupon the court fined

77. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513 (1995) ( [T]he j dge m
be permi ed o
in r c he j r on he la and o in i ha he j r follo hi in r c ion . ); Horning v. District of
Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 139 (1920) (Brandei , J., di en ing) ( Since Sparf v. United States . . . it is
settled that, even in criminal cases, it is the duty of the jury to apply the law given them by the
pre iding j dge o he fac
hich he find. ).
78. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Jury as Constitutional Identity, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1105, 1140 44 (2014) (discussing the rise of formalized instructions that constrain the role of the
jury); 9TH CIR. MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTR. CRIM. 3.1 (2019) ( I i also your duty to apply
he la a I gi e i o o o he fac a o find hem, he her o agree i h he la or no . ); see
also 1ST CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIM. 3.01 (2019); 3D CIR. MODEL JURY INSTR. CRIM. 3.01
(2015); 5TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIM. 1.04 (2019); 6TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR.
CRIM. 1.02 (2019); 7TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIM. 1.01 (2019); 8TH CIR. PATTERN JURY
INSTR. CRIM. 3.02 (2017); 10TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIM. 1.04 (2018); 11TH CIR.
PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIM. B2.2 (2016); JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. 200 (2020).
79. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir. 2017).
80. See Bressler, supra note 19, at 1138 n.12; Thomas, 116 F.3d at 616 17.
81. Bushell s Case (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006; see also Howe, supra note 35, at 583.
82. Scheflin, supra note 35, at 168, 170.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Penn & Meads Case, 6 Howell s 951, 963 (1670)).
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them and ordered them imprisoned until their fines were paid.85 They
sought release from prison by petitioning for habeas corpus relief.86 On
review of the writ, the reviewing court declared that the jury could not be
punished or forced to deliver a conviction.87 That case has been viewed as
establishing a general rule that jurors cannot be punished for acquitting
in he ee h of bo h la and fac . 88
Courts similarly cannot direct the jury to issue a guilty verdict, no
ma er ho compelling he go ernmen e idence ma be.89 To do so
deprives the defendant of the right to trial by jury, because the judge, not
the jury, has adjudicated guilt.90 A directed verdict for the government
e i cera e he Si h Amendmen j r rial righ b depri ing he j r
of the ultimate decision whether to acquit.91
Between these extremes, there is some room for disagreement. But
American j dge ha e generall a oided ch in erference a
o ld
divest juries of their power to acquit an accused, even though the evidence
of hi g il ma be clear. 92 And the Supreme Court has made clear that a
rial j dge i hereb barred from a emp ing o o erride or in erfere i h
he j ror independen j dgmen in a manner con rar o he in ere of
85. Id. at 171 (quoting Penn & Meads Case, 6 Howell s at 967).
86. Id. at 172.
87. Id.; B hell Ca e (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1010 ( If he meaning of he e ord , finding
against the direction of the Court in matter of law, be, that if the Judge having heard the evidence
given in Court (for he knows no other) shall tell the jury, upon this evidence, the law is for the plaintiff,
or for the defendant, and you are under the pain of fine and imprisonment to find accordingly, then
the jury ought of duty so to do; every man sees that the jury is but a troublesome delay, great charge,
and of no use in determining right and wrong, and therefore the tryals [sic] by them may be better
aboli h d han con in ed; hich ere a range ne -found conclusion, after a tryal [sic] so celebrated
for many hundreds of years. For if the Judge, from the evidence, shall by his own judgment first
resolve upon any tryal [sic] what the fact is, and so knowing the fact, shall then resolve what the law
is, and order the jury penalty to find accordingly, what either necessary or convenient use can be
fancied of j rie , or o con in e rial b hem a all? ).
88. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920); see also United States v. Thomas,
116 F.3d 606, 615 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that since Bushell s Case, n llif ing j ror ha e been
pro ec ed from being called o acco n for heir erdic ).
89. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.,
430 U.S. 564, 572 73 (1977)); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 276 (1952)
( [J] rie are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to judges. . . . They might have refused to
brand Mori e e a a hief. Had he done o, ha oo o ld ha e been he end of he ma er. ).
90. Rose, 478 U.S. at 578.
91. Id.; Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993); United Brotherhood of Carpenters v.
United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947).
92. United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 520 (1972); see also United States v. Wilson, 629 F.2d
439, 442 (6 h Cir. 1980) ( In he e erci e of i f nc ion no onl m
he j r be free from direc
control in its verdict, but it must be free from judicial pressure, both contemporaneous and
b eq en . (q o ing Uni ed S a e . Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180 81 (1st Cir. 1969))).
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he acc ed. 93
Applied to the question of jury instructions about nullification, the
uneasy consensus, at least in the Ninth Circuit and some states, is that a
court may strongly admonish jurors to follow the law but cannot
affirmatively misstate their power or threaten them with punishment.94
Accordingl , a co r hould not state or imply (1) that jurors could be
punished for nullification, or that (2) an acquittal resulting from
n llifica ion i in alid. 95 The problem with such instructions is that they
deprive juries of their ability to freely choose whether to acquit and, in
doing so, begin to resemble a directed verdict, which plainly violates the
Sixth Amendment.96
Just what constitutes impermissible coercion is a difficult question, as
several recent cases elucidate. For example, in United States v.
Kleinman,97 the district court was faced with circumstances that raised
concern about nullification.98 The defendant, who ran a medical marijuana
dispensary in California that at least arguably complied with state law,
had been charged with federal drug crimes.99 In trying to encourage jurors
to faithfully apply the federal law which would, under the essentially
undisputed facts, require conviction the court instructed the jurors that
he
o ld iola e heir oa h and he la if he
illf ll bro gh a

93. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 573.
94. See United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1079 (9th Cir. 2018); State v. Smith-Parker, 340
P.3d 485, 506 (Kan. 2014).
95. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1032 (9th Cir. 2017). But see United States v.
Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding, over a strong dissent, that the district court
did no err in in r c ing he j r ha here i no ch hing a alid j r n llifica ion and ha j ror
o ld iola e [ heir] oa h and the law if [they] willfully brought in a verdict contrary to the law given
o in hi ca e ). The Second Circ i ha
gge ed ha i o ld be improper for he di ric co r
to provide an instruction that (incorrectly) asserts that an inconsistent verdict on multiple counts
would be invalid. See United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420, 422 23 (2d Cir. 1967) ( [A]llo ing
inconsistent verdicts in criminal trials runs the risk that an occasional conviction may have been the
result of compromise. But the advantage of leaving the jury free to exercise its historic power of lenity
ha been correc l ho gh o o eigh ha danger. (ci ing Uni ed S a e . Ma b r , 274 F.2d 899,
902 03 (2d Cir. 1960))); Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d at 507 (finding that, although the jury need not be
affirmatively instructed of its inherent power to nullify, the trial court erred by giving an instruction
ha e en iall forbade he j r from e erci ing i po er of n llifica ion ). In he con e of dea h
penalty sentencing admittedly a unique scenario the Supreme Court has made clear that juries
m be allo ed moral la i de; n llifica ion in r c ion ha depri e he j r of an adeq a e ehicle
for e pre ing i rea oned moral re pon e o . . . mi iga ing e idence are improper. Abdul-Kabir
v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 263 (2007) (quoting Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001)).
96. Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d at 507.
97. 880 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2017).
98. Id. at 1026.
99. Id.
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erdic con rar o he la gi en o [ hem] in hi ca e. 100 That
in r c ion, he Nin h Circ i concl ded on appeal, co ld be construed to
imply that nullification could be punished, particularly since the
in r c ion came in he mid of a criminal rial. 101 The court also
in r c ed he j ror ha [ ]here i no
ch hing a
alid j r
n llifica ion,
hich gge ed ha they do not have the power to
n llif , and o i o ld be a ele e erci e. 102 In doing both of those
things, the Ninth Circuit held, the district court erred.103
The line be een firm in r c ion and impermi ible coercion i a
blurry one. Nearly the same instructions that the Ninth Circuit
disapproved in Kleinman had passed muster in the Sixth Circuit.104 And
just a year after its decision in Kleinman, in United States v. Lynch,105 the
Ninth Circuit itself (in another marijuana case) approved anti-nullification
in r c ion ha bo h in oked he j ror oa h and arg abl
gge ed
by way of extracting individual promises from the jurors that they could
not determine whether the law was just or unjust that nullification might
be punishable.106 The co r in ructions in Lynch were, as the dissent
poin ed o , ma eriall indi ing i hable from ho e he co r had
disapproved in Kleinman, but the majority in Lynch concluded that the
district court had not erred in providing them.107 The precise boundaries
of what may and may not be said about nullification thus remain unclear
across and even within jurisdictions.108
100. Id. at 1032.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1032 33.
103. Id. at 1033.
104. United States v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988). In Krzyske, the district court
re ponded o a j r q e ion abo he meaning of n llifica ion i h he follo ing: There i no ch
thing as valid jury nullification. Your obligation is to follow the instructions of the Court as to the law
given to you. You would violate your oath and the law if you willfully brought in a verdict contrary
o he la gi en o in hi ca e. Id.
105. 903 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2018).
106. Id. at 1079, 1088 89. In Lynch, the district court instructed jurors:
Nullification is by definition a viola ion of he j ror oa h hich, if o are a j ror in hi ca e,
you will take to apply the law as instructed by the court. As a . . . juror, you cannot substitute
your sense of justice, whatever it may be, for your duty to follow the law, whether you agree
with the law or not. It is not your determination whether the law is just or when a law is unjust.
That cannot be and is not your task.
Id. at 1079. The court then asked each prospective juror if he or she could abide by that instruction,
and each juror agreed to do so. Id.
107. Id. at 1088.
108. Petitions for certiorari were filed in both Kleinman and Lynch, but the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in both cases. Kleinman v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 113 (2018) (denying
certiorari); Lynch v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2717 (2019) (denying certiorari).
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For now, however, let us assume that we both understand and accept
these basic rules: (1) a court need not and should not instruct a jury of its
power to nullify; (2) a court may firmly admonish a jury that it should
follow the law; but (3) a co r ma no affirma i el mi a e he j r
power or threaten jurors with punishment. What happens on appeal if a
trial court runs afoul of that third rule? The answer to that question will
depend in large part upon whether the error is considered structural.
II.

WEAVER AND STRUCTURAL ERROR

A.

The (Relatively) New Kid on the Block: Harmless Error Analysis
for Constitutional Violations

[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a
perfec one. 109 When a trial has been fair but imperfect, the harmless error
doctrine insulates convictions from reversal.110 Thus, where a court can
confidently conclude that a minor error for example, an insignificant
violation of a non-constitutional procedural rule did not influence the
jury or affect the verdict, the conviction can be affirmed despite
the error.111
The harmless error doctrine was born in part from concern that accurate
and fairly obtained convictions would be overturned for minor technical
defects.112 To assuage that concern, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 2111,113
which provided that appellate courts should review lower court decisions
i ho regard o error or defec
hich do not affect the substantial
righ of he par ie . 114 But the so-called harmle error a e did no
shed much light on what types of errors would or would not affect
substantial rights.115 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were later
amended to implemen he harmle error a e, manda ing ha [a]n
error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial
righ m be di regarded. 116 That rule, too, failed to explain which types
109. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986).
110. Justin Murray, A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1791,
1793 (2017).
111. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 65 (1946); see also Murray, supra note 110, at
1799.
112. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2032; Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split,
88 VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2111.
114. Id.; Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2033 34.
115. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2034.
116. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); see also Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2034.
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of errors might affect substantial rights.117
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, it was largely assumed that
constitutional errors were by definition harmful.118 After all, if a right was
important enough to be enshrined in the Federal Constitution, it seems
reasonable that its violation would nece aril affec he par ie
b an ial righ . 119 Accordingly, constitutional errors automatically
resulted in reversal.120
Tha changed i h he S preme Co r 1967 deci ion in Chapman v.
California.121 In Chapman, the Supreme Court concluded that
constitutional errors like other errors were subject to harmless error
analysis.122 I ob er ed ha here ma be ome con i ional error
which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be
deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of
the con ic ion. 123
To avoid reversal on the basis of a constitutional error, the Court in
Chapman held ha he beneficiar of a con i ional error o ld ha e
to demonstrate ha he error a harmle
be ond a rea onable
124
do b .
Accordingly, an appellate court may affirm despite
con i ional error if i i clear be ond a rea onable do b ha ch error
did no affec he o come of he proceeding or did no con rib e to the
erdic ob ained. 125
But the Court in Chapman al o ackno ledged ha here are ome
constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never

117. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2034.
118. Id. at 2035 36.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2111; FED. R. CRIM P. 52(a); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
764 65 (1946) ( If, hen all i aid and done, he con ic ion i
re ha he error did not influence
the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where
he depar re i from a con i ional norm or a pecific command of Congre . (ci ing Br no .
United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939))).
120. Kamin, supra note 112, at 10; Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2035.
121. 386 U.S. 18 (1967); see also Kamin, supra note 112, at 10; Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2035;
Stacy & Dayton, supra note 10, at 82 83. The Court foreshadowed Chapman conclusion that even
constitutional error could be harmless a few years before in Fahy v. Connecticut, 372 U.S. 928 (1963).
122. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 24.
125. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2036 37; see also United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1034
35 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the standard for affirming a conviction despite constitutional error
is somewhat elevated compared to the harmlessness standard for non-constitutional errors, which
allows affirmance if it is more probable than not that the error did not affect the verdict).

Yorke (Do Not Delete)

10/5/2020 3:54 PM

1460

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

be rea ed a harmle
was born.127

error.

B.

126

[Vol. 95:1441

And with that, the idea of structural error

The Rare Bird: Structural Error

After Chapman, courts and commentators struggled to determine
which constitutional errors should result in automatic reversal.128
Chapman itself provided little clarity, defining an entire category of per
se reversible constitutional error in a single sentence and footnote.129 The
see, e.g., ci a ion in ha foo no e gge ed hree righ
ho e iola ion
would require per se reversal the protection against coerced confession,
the right to counsel, and the right to an impartial judge.130 What else might
q alif a an one g e .131
For about a quarter-century following Chapman, courts took an ad hoc
approach when deciding whether a particular constitutional error should
be subject to harmless error analysis.132 It was an odd task, requiring
courts, without much guidance, to parse constitutional protections into
first- and second-class rights.133 Courts struggled to determine which
constitutional protections were negotiable and which were so fundamental
to any conception of a fair trial that their violation was
inherently harmful.134
126. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. In a footnote, the Court provided three examples of such rights: the
prohibition against coerced confessions, the right to counsel, and the right to an impartial judge. Id.
at 23 n.8.
127. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2037. The decision in Chapman established the basic premise
that certain constitutional errors were subject to harmless error analysis while others were not.
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23. That latter category of error was dubbed structural almost twenty-five
years later, in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). See Weaver v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __,
137 S. Ct. 1899, 1902 03 (2017).
128. See Fairfax, supra note 10, a 2037 ( The diffic l of de ermining hich error can ne er be
harmless and, thus, are reversible per se continues to present obstacles to achieving a coherent
concep ion of harmle error doc rine. ); S ac & Da on, supra note 10, at 83 84 ( Commen a or
writing in Chapman immedia e af erma h ere ncer ain he her mo con i ional error o ld
be treated under a harmless error rule rather than a rule of automatic reversal. Appellate courts
likewise exhibited uncertainty regarding the specific rights to which Chapman applie . ).
129. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 n.8.
130. Id.
131. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2037 38; Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional
Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 426 27 (1980).
132. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2038.
133. See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 10, at 90 (recognizing that singling out only certain
constitutional violations for automatic reversal created a hierarchy of constitutional rights, and
arg ing ha [ ]here i no hi orical or r c ral rea on o ppo e ha he framer in ended righ
having truth-furthering purposes to carry more eigh han righ ha ing o her p rpo e ).
134. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 75 n.1 (1983) (explaining that federal courts
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Over the ensuing years, a few constitutional protections cleared the
hurdle to qualify as per se reversible error, while the vast majority did
not.135 The Supreme Court applied harmless error analysis to a plethora of
constitutional violations, including to jury instructions that misstated an
element of the offense or contained improper presumptions,
Confrontation Clause violations, admission of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and denial of counsel at preliminary
hearings.136 In at least some of those cases, however, the Court did not
provide a reasoned analysis as to why the particular error should or should
not be subject to harmless error review.137 And the reasoning in other
cases lacked rigor, asking whether the error rendered the trial
f ndamen all nfair b lacking a frame ork in hich o an er ha
question.138 Contemporary commentators observed that the Court had
failed o anno nce an coheren ra ionale a o hich iola ion are o be
re ie ed b he ric a oma ic re er al andard and hich b he
more lenien harmle error andard. 139

had taken different approaches to assessing harmless error and had reached different results as to
whether a particular error should be per se reversible).
135. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2038; Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 07 (1991).
Errors deemed to be structural included denial of the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 342 44 (1963), denial of the right of self-representation, McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.
168, 177 n.8 (1984), and denial of the right to public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9
(1984).
136. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 342 44; see also Goldberg, supra note 131, at 427 28.
137. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 54 (1970) (concluding without analysis that
the admission of inadmissible evidence was harmless).
138. See, e.g., Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 502 (1987) (noting that errors that render a trial
fundamentally unfair should be automatically reversed, but concluding without rigorous analysis that
incorrectly instructing the jury on an element of the charged crime did not render the trial
fundamentally unfair). In Connecticut v. Johnson, the Court assessed the potential harm from the
particular error at issue in order to determine whether that error should be subject to harmless error
analysis at all. 460 U.S. at 86 87. Its conclusion illustrates the circularity: the erroneous instruction
was no o ill-suited to both the theory on which the case was tried and the evidence that was
pre en ed, ha i can be deemed harmle . . . . Such an error deprived respondent of
con i ional righ o ba ic o a fair rial ha heir infrac ion can ne er be treated as harmless
error.
Id. at 87 88 (citation omitted). In other cases, the question of harmlessness bled into the question of
whether an error occurred at all. See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless:
When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1178 (1995) (explaining that courts
ha e gone o far a o incorporate the harmlessness inquiry into the determination of whether an
error has even occurred (empha i in original)).
139. Robert Pondolfi, Comment, Principles for Application of the Harmless Error Standard, 41 U.
CHI. L. REV. 616, 616 (1974); see also The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Leading Cases, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 100, 107 (1986) ( The S preme Co r ha e o de elop a coheren andard for de ermining
when a violation of the federal Constitution . . . ma con i e harmle error. ).
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In Arizona v. Fulminante,140 a fractured and slim majority of the
Supreme Court attempted to provide some coherence to the analysis.141
S r e ing he
ide range 142 of constitutional errors that had been
subjected to harmless error review over the years, the Court looked for a
common hread connec ing he e ca e . 143 That thread, the Court
concl ded, a ha each in ol ed rial error error which occurred
during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore
be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in
order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a
rea onable do b . 144 In contrast, errors that were per se reversible were
ho e ha in ol ed
r c ral defec in he con i ion of he rial
mechanism, which defy analysis by harmle -error andard . 145 Such
errors like the denial of the right to self-representation or a public trial
in ol ed a r c ral defec affec ing he frame ork i hin hich he
rial proceed , ra her han impl an error in he rial proce i elf. 146
The Fulminante majority created what it couched as a bright-line rule:
rial error
ere bjec o harmle error anal i ; r c ral defec
were per se reversible.147 That rule, it posited, was merely the result of
inductive reasoning a common hread 148 ari ing o of a compari on
of the constitutional violations which we have held subject to harmless
error, and ho e hich e ha e held no . 149
Ironicall , ho e er, he Co r applica ion of he Fulminante rule
immediately ran counter to the case that started it all, Chapman.150 In
140. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
141. Id. at 307 09.
142. Id. at 306.
143. Id. at 307.
144. Id. at 307 08; see also Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752 54 (1990) (improper
aggravating circumstances instructions); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989) (improper
jury instructions); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501 04 (1987) (improper jury instructions); Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 574 76 (1986) (improper jury instructions); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 676 78 (1986) (Confrontation Clause violations); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977)
(denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 32 (1973)
(Confrontation Clause violations); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 53 (1970) (admission of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendmen ); Coleman . Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10 11
(1970) (denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing).
145. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309.
146. Id. at 310.
147. See Gregory Mitchell, Against Overwhelming Appellate Activism: Constraining Harmless
Error Review, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1994).
148. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307.
149. Id. at 310.
150. Edwards, supra note 138, at 1177.
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acknowledging that certain constitutional protections were so
fundamental that their violation should result in per se reversal, Chapman
had referenced the public trial right, the right to representation, and the
protection against coerced confessions.151 Applying its new rubric, the
Fulminante Court concluded that, despite Chapman e plici reference
to coerced confessions, the admission of involuntary statements or
confessions was a run-of-the-mill trial error and, as such, could
be harmless.152
Fulminante
ppo ed brigh line a a f ll f
pon clo er
inspection.153 Academic criticism of the distinction between trial errors
and structural defects is legion,154 and rightfully so. Professor Justin
Murray neatly summarized the analytical problems with Fulminante
approach:
The conceptual foundation of Fulminante is tenuous at best. The
terms trial error and structural defect as used there refer,
respectively, to errors or defects relating to the procedure or
structure of a criminal trial. But error is virtually synonymous
with defect in this context, and dictionary entries for procedure
and structure suggest that trial procedure and trial structure
likewise have similar meanings. Confusing matters further, the
Supreme Cour ha endor ed e eral differen and largel
incon i en
in erpre a ion
of
he
rial/ r c ral-error
dichotomy, each ambiguous in its own right and unable to explain
which errors the Court has subjected to harmless error review and
which it has not.155
Di ing i hing be een rial error and r c ral defec
a h
conceptually unsound and pragmatically unhelpful.156 No principled
di inc ion e i be een error ha occ r[red] during presentation of
he ca e o he j r and ho e ha affec [ ]he entire conduct of the trial
151. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967).
152. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 295, 309 10. The reasoning in Fulminante also fails to square with
some of the other errors that the Court had already deemed to be structural. See Steven M. Shepard,
Note, The Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 YALE L.J. 1180, 1207 09
(2008).
153. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006); Alan Hirsch, Confessions
and Harmless Error: A New Argument for the Old Approach, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 24 (2007).
154. See Hirsch, supra note 153, at 3, 24 26; David McCord, The Trial / Structural Error
Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1401, 1413 14 (1997); Daniel J. Meltzer,
Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 4 (1994); Charles J. Ogletree,
Jr., Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced
Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 165 66 (1991).
155. Murray, supra note 110, at 1807 08 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
156. Id. at 1809.
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from beginning o end. 157 How is it that the impact of an improperly
admitted coerced confession or a jury instruction that fails to include an
element of the crime does not permeate the trial?158 Or, even if such a
distinction could be made purely as a technical matter, is it necessarily
more unfair to deny a defendant his (likely self-defeating)159 wish to
represent himself than it is to admit a coerced confession or deny a
defendant his right to cross-examine adverse witnesses?
Although the analytical framework for distinguishing structural error
from harmless error remained unclear post-Fulminante, with
commentators questioning its essential wisdom, two things were apparent.
First, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts were reluctant to add
new constitutional rights to the ranks of structural error.160 Indeed, in the
years following Fulminante, the Supreme Court classified only a small
handful of constitutional violations as structural error.161 Second, as a
general matter, harmless error review was proving to be an extremely
important aspect of appellate decision making and the determinative
factor in a huge number of cases.162 The question whether a particular
error was subject to harmless error review thus remained a critical one,
even as the means for answering that question remained unclear.163
C.

A Modicum of Clarity: The Supreme Court s Decision in Weaver

The Supreme Court provided some much-needed guidance in its 2017
decision in Weaver.164 While still purporting to affirm the basic premise
157. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307, 309 10.
158. See Hirsch, supra note 153, a 25 ( Tha di inc ion, ho e er, bordina e reality to
technicality. A wrongly admitted confession does indeed affect the entire trial from beginning to
end. ).
159. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).
160. Murray, supra note 110, at 1809 10.
161. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2039; see also, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,
150 (2006) (denial of counsel of choice constitutes structural error); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 280 81 (1993) (defective reasonable doubt instruction constitutes structural error).
162. See, e.g., Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Foreword: Harmless Error Review in the Second Circuit,
63 BROOK. L. REV. 395, 395 (1997) ( The doc rine of harmle error i one of he mo impor an
doctrines in appellate decision making. Harmless error principles are employed in reviewing errors
of all types, from improperly admitted evidence to serious constitutional errors. It is quite possible
that these principles determine the outcome of more criminal appeals than any other doctrine . . . . );
Murray, supra note 110, a 1793 ( [W]hen co r do perform harmle error anal i , he concl de
ha he error nder re ie i harmle
i h remarkable freq enc . (foo no e omi ed)).
163. As will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV, the argument has been made that designating
an error as structural does not necessarily guarantee that the right at issue will be better protected. See
infra Part IV.
164. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017).
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of Fulminante, the Court delved more deeply into the rationales
underlying the distinction between constitutional errors that warranted
automatic reversal and those that did not.165 In doing so, the Court
articulated three main categories of structural error.
Fir , an error ma be r c ral if he righ a i e i no de igned o
protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some
o her in ere . 166 Rights that fall under this paradigm include the
defendan righ o elf-representation, which has little or nothing to do
with truth-finding and everything to do with autonomy, whether wisely
exercised or not.167 Beca e harm i irrele an o he ba i nderl ing he
righ , he Co r ha deemed a iola ion of ha righ r c ral error. 168
Second, an error ma be r c ral if he effec of he error are impl
oo hard o mea re. 169 The Court offered a an e ample a defendan
right to select his or her own attorney.170 The consequences of depriving
a defendant of that right are difficult to assess.171 Accordingl , [b]eca e
the government will, as a result, find it almost impossible to show that the
error a harmle be ond a rea onable do b , he efficienc co of
le ing he go ernmen r o make he ho ing are nj ified. 172
Third, an error ma be r c ral if he error al a re l in
f ndamen al nfairne . 173 Examples of such errors include denial of
representation to an indigent defendant or a failure to instruct the jury on
reasonable doubt.174 Because the resulting trial is always a fundamentally
nfair one, i
o ld be f ile for he go ernmen o r
o
show harmle ne . 175
Some structural errors satisfy more than one of these rationales.176 For
165. Id. at 1907 08; see also Murray, supra note 110, at 1793 (identifying the rationales underlying
harmless error review).
166. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 n.4 (2006)).
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)). Other errors whose effects are
nece aril nq an ifiable and inde ermina e incl de pro iding he j r
i h ri en in r c ion
but failing to read those instructions aloud. United States v. Becerra, 939 F.3d 995, 1005 (9th Cir.
2019) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 11 (1999)).
171. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.
172. Id. (citation omitted).
173. Id.
174. Id. Under a strict reading of Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), failure to provide a
reasonable doubt instruction would seem to be trial error because it occurs at the end of trial.
175. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.
176. Id.
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example, violation of the right to a public trial is a structural error under
both of the first two rationales articulated in Weaver.177 The public-trial
righ pro ec ome in ere
ha do no belong o he defendan
namel , he righ of he p blic a large, and he pre , a ell a he
righ of he acc ed. 178 The effects of a violation of the public-trial right
are also very difficult to measure.179 For both of those reasons, the error is
structural even if it does not always result in fundamental unfairness.180
In addition to clarifying the rationales for categorizing error as
structural, the Court in Weaver also clarified the significance of
designating an error as structural. When an objection to a structural error
ha been made a rial and he error i rai ed on direc appeal, he
defendan generall i en i led o a oma ic re er al, regardle of he
error ac al effec on he o come. 181 When, however, an error is not
preserved at trial and is raised through an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim in federal habeas proceedings, the availability of automatic reversal
depends on whether the error at issue in fact rendered the trial
fundamentally unfair.182 Accordingly, although an error that satisfies any
one of the rationales in Weaver may be deemed structural, not all
structural errors are created equal. Only those that satisfy the third
rationale fundamental unfairness result in automatic reversal in
contexts other than direct appellate review.183
III. COERCIVE ANTI-NULLIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS
SATISFY ALL THREE WEAVER CATEGORIES OF
STRUCTURAL ERROR
With these principles in mind, we return, then, to the central question
of this Article. Suppose a trial court provides a coercive anti-nullification
instruction to the jury, threatening it with punishment if it disregards the
law and suggesting that an acquittal resulting from nullification would be
invalid. Upon review of that error on direct appeal, should an appellate
court ask whether the error was harmless, or should the error instead result
in automatic reversal? In other words, do coercive anti-nullification
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
2019).

Id. at 1909.
Id. at 1910.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1910 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999)).
Id. at 1911; see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469 70 (1997).
See Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1910 11; United States v. Becerra, 939 F.3d 995, 1005 06 (9th Cir.
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instructions qualify as structural error?
The courts that have directly considered this question have concluded
that coercive anti-nullification instructions do not amount to structural
error.184 Most of those decisions pre-date Weaver, relying at times on a
formalistic (and outdated) dichotomy between trial errors and structural
defec ha doe no permi a j r in r c ion error to be considered a
r c ral error. 185 A lea
o deci ion , he Nin h Circ i opinion in
United States v. Kleinman and United States v. Lynch, post-date
Weaver.186 Contrary to those decisions, however, coercive antinullification instructions should qualify as structural error under not just
one, but all three, of Weaver ra ionale .
A.

The Interests at Stake

One rationale for deeming a constitutional error automatically
reversible is that the right at issue was designed to protect an interest other
han he defendan in ere in a oiding erroneo con ic ion.187 Under
those circumstances, asking whether the error prejudiced the particular
defendant in other words, contributed to a possibly incorrect guilty
verdict would be beside the point because the right requiring vindication
was not aimed at ensuring the accuracy of criminal convictions.188 The
prohibition on coercive anti-nullification instructions satisfies
this rationale.
We must first consider what is meant by the phrase erroneo
con ic ion. 189 Weaver does not define the term.190 In common parlance,
however, we think of an erroneous conviction as the conviction of a
184. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2017); State v. Smith-Parker, 340
P.3d 485, 506 07 (Kan. 2014).
185. United States v. Conti, 804 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 8, 9
( Unlike ch defec a he comple e depri a ion of co n el or rial before a bia ed j dge, an
instruction that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial
fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for de ermining g il or innocence. ); Smith-Parker,
340 P.3d at 506 07.
186. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020; United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2018). Weaver was
decided shortly after the panel issued its original opinion in United States v. Kleinman, 859 F.3d 825
(9th Cir. 2017), which was later withdrawn and replaced with an opinion addressing Weaver.
Compare Kleinman, 859 F.3d 825, with Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020. The Ninth Circuit has been a
particularly fruitful source of decisions related to nullification in recent years, likely because states
within its jurisdiction were among the first to pass medical marijuana laws and because of the political
makeup of the populations within those states, which skews both liberal and antiauthoritarian.
187. Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1908.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1903.
190. Id.

Yorke (Do Not Delete)

1468

10/5/2020 3:54 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1441

defendant for a crime they did not, in fact, commit.191 Erroneous
convictions often result from getting the facts wrong, whether because of
mistaken eyewitness testimony, faulty or dishonest forensics, false
confessions, unreliable informants, or simply poor defense
representation.192 Therefore, the question here is whether the right at issue
is aimed at preventing the conviction of defendants who did not actually
commit the crimes charged.
Rights that are designed to prevent erroneous convictions tend to be
r h-f r hering righ
rights that seek to ensure that the fact-finding
process is as accurate as possible.193 Numerous constitutional provisions
are designed at least in large part to ensure the reliability of verdicts and
protect against such fact-finding mistakes. For example, the Sixth
Amendmen g aran ee of confron a ion and adeq a e repre en a ion
help ensure that the jury has enough information to test the reliability of
witnesses and evidence.194
Rights concerned with other interests such as institutional soundness
or notions of fair play end o be r h-ne ral or r h-impairing. 195
Examples of truth-neutral or truth-impairing rights include the Fourth
Amendmen pro ec ion again nrea onable earch and ei re and he
Fif h Amendmen
pri ilege again
elf-incrimination.196 Enforcing
those rights might allow guilty defendants to go free, but they are
important because they function as bulwarks against government
overreach and misconduct.197
So, what about the right at issue here? Appellate courts have been
reluctant to delve into the precise nature of the constitutional violation that
occurs when a trial court suggests that a jury lacks the power to or may be
punished for acquitting, acknowledging only that the error implicates the
Sixth Amendment.198 But there are at least two ways to understand the
191. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to
Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 336 37 (2002) (discussing how DNA evidence
can be used to exonerate someone who is legally innocent but was erroneously convicted).
192. Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful Convictions After a
Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825, 841 (2010).
193. See Murray, supra note 110, at 1811.
194. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 79 (1986).
195. Murray, supra note 110, at 1811 12; see also Stacy & Dayton, supra note 10, at 87 90.
196. Murray, supra note 110, at 1815 16, 1812 n.115; see also Stacy & Dayton, supra note 10, at
89.
197. Un rpri ingl , no all righ fi nea l in o one bo . Some er e m l iple p rpo e : [T]he
seek not only to foster the reliability of the fact-finding process, but also to promote other truth-neutral
values such as participa ion or fair pla . S ac & Da on, supra note 10, at 89.
198. See United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1087 88 (9th Cir. 2018) (Watford, J., dissenting)
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violation that explain its constitutional scope and do not disturb (or at least
only marginally ruffle) existing precedent.
The best explanation and the one that aligns with existing
precedent is that providing instructions that mislead or threaten the jury
as to its power to acquit comes too close to issuing a directed verdict. This
was the tack taken by the Kansas Supreme Court, which ruled
ncon i ional a j r in r c ion ha e en iall forbade he j r from
e erci ing i po er of n llifica ion. 199 That instruction, the court
concluded, fle
oo clo e o he n of direc ing a erdic for he
S a e. 200 When an instruction convinces jurors that they lack the power
to acquit or will face punishment for doing so, the defendant is deprived
of a meaningful trial by jury.201 While the jury may nominally deliver the
verdict, it is the judge that has decided the question of guilt.202 Coercive
anti-nullification instructions therefore approach a flat denial of the jury
trial right enshrined in Article III203 and the Sixth Amendment.204
A second way to conceive of the error here is that, while the defendant
has no right to nullification, the jury itself has a right to perform its role
as the arbiter of guilt or innocence, and the community has a right to
meaningful participation in that process.205 By hamstringing the jury in
performing its role, coercive anti-nullification instructions intrude upon
he j r area of e cl i e compe ence. Thi a of concep ali ing he
violation aligns with the emerging scholarly understanding of the jury trial
right as belonging not only to the defendant but to the jury and the
community.206 It also comports with the historical understanding of the
(ackno ledging ha j rie ha e no righ o n llif b e plaining ha prohibi ing j rie from
e erci ing heir po er o do o can none hele cro [] he con i ional line ). The fac ha co r
have applied the harmlessness standard applicable to constitutional error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, rather than just more likely than not confirms that the error at issue has a
constitutional dimension. Id. at 1088 89.
199. State v. Smith-Parker, 340 P.3d 485, 507 (Kan. 2014).
200. Id.
201. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 912 (1994) ( Pro agoni in he con ro er o er he j r
authority to resolve legal questions shared much common ground. For one hing, no one di p ed he
principle of noncoercion of j ror
a principle ha Chief J ice Va ghan r ling in Bushell s Case
had e abli hed in England in 1671. (foo no e omi ed)).
202. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 78 (1986).
203. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
204. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
205. See Fairfax, supra note 10, a 2056 ( There i ample ppor for he ie ha he j r ha
institutional interests separate and distinct from that of the criminal defendant upon whose fate it
delibera e . ); APPLEMAN, supra note 41, at 13 37.
206. See Fairfax, supra note 10, a 2055 ( The e con i ional and radi ional in i ional
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j r a a fairl a onomo bod capable of deciding in he defendan
favor all of the relevant questions factual, legal, moral presented by
a case.207
Under either conception of the violation, the right at issue concerns the
Con i ion g aran ee of rial b a j r ha ha he po er o make a
meaningful choice about whether to acquit a particular defendant. The
question, then, is whether the jury trial right itself was intended to prevent
defendants from being convicted of crimes they did not actually commit,
or whether it was instead designed primarily to protect some other interest.
The Ninth Circuit squarely confronted this question in its 2017 decision
in Kleinman.208 Asked whether improperly coercive anti-nullification
instructions qualified as structural error, the court considered whether the
right at issue was designed primarily to protect interests other than the
defendan
in ere in a oiding erroneo con ic ion.209 The Ninth
Circuit summarily dismissed the possibility that coercive antinullification instructions satisfied this rationale for structural error. Its
anal i of he i e, in f ll: Plainly, the instant error was not of this kind,
as the jury trial right it implicated is designed precisely to protect
defendan from erroneo con ic ion. 210 But the answer is not as plain
as Kleinman r nca ed anal i o ld gge .
The righ of rial b j r in criminal cases is fundamental to the

functions of the jury, many of which are separate and distinct from the role of securing the individual
righ of criminal defendan , ha e beg n o recei e he grea er recogni ion he de er e. ); La ra I.
Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 436 37 (2009); APPLEMAN,
supra note 41, at 13 37.
207. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 241 42 (1st ed. 2005)
( Tho gh
en -first-century judicial orthodoxy frowns on these claims of constitutional
competence, the right of grand juries and trial juries to just say no in certain contexts draws strength
from the letter and spirit of the Bill of Rights. . . . [T]he Fifth Amendment . . . continues to shield any
acq i al rendered b a criminal j r . ); see also Howe, supra note 35, a 584 ( There ere . . . many
ear in o r hi or
hen j rie ere pecificall in r c ed ha he co ld di regard he j dge
opinion of he la and de ermine ha ma er for hem el e . ).
208. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2017).
209. Id.
210. Id. The court failed to include any citation in support of the proposition that the jury trial right
i de igned preci el o pro ec defendan from erroneo con ic ion. See id. The timing of the
Nin h Circ i deci ion in Kleinman may explain the rather cursory analysis. The Ninth Circuit
originally decided Kleinman in June 2017, shortly before the Supreme Court decided Weaver. United
States v. Kleinman, 859 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2017) (withdrawn and superseded on rehearing). In that
original opinion, the court had concluded that the error was not structural under Fulminante rial
error/structural defect distinction. Id. at 838. After Weaver was decided, the panel in Kleinman
withdrew the original opinion and issued a new opinion, Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1033, which reached
he ame concl ion nder he S preme Co r ne ar ic la ion of he andard for r c ral error.
Compare Kleinman, 859 F.3d at 835 38, with Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1031 36.
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American cheme of j ice. 211 I ha been de cribed a
he pinal
col mn of American democrac 212 and reflec [ ] a profo nd j dgmen
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice
admini ered. 213 The jury trial righ i he onl g aran ee common o he
12 state constitutions that predated the Constitutional Convention, and it
has appeared in the constitution of every State to enter the Union
hereaf er. 214 It is the only right to be enshrined in both the body of the
Constitution and in the Bill of Rights.215
Why were the Framers so excited about trial by jury? It was not because
of any exceptional ability of juries to determine facts without error.
Indeed, although it is difficult to study jury accuracy empirically, research
tends to suggest that juries are not particularly accurate fact-finders.216
That makes some intuitive sense. Juries are composed of laypeople of
varying intelligence, experience, prejudices, and attention spans.217 And
[ ]here i li le e idence ha reg lar people do m ch be er han chance
a epara ing r h from lie . 218 If the point was accuracy in other
words, protecting defendants from erroneous convictions one can
imagine the Framers designing a very different system that might not have
included juries at all.219
211. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
212. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Fairfax, supra
note 10, at 2052 (footnote omitted) (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
213. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155.
214. Neder, 527 U.S. at 31.
215. Id. at 30. Article III, Section 2, Clause 3, of he Con i ion pro ide : The Trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such trial shall be held in the state
where the said Crimes shall have been committed . . . . U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth
Amendment, in turn, pro ide : In all criminal pro ec ion , he acc ed hall enjo he righ o a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . . . . U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
216. See, e.g., Hal. R. Arkes & Barbara A. Mellers, Do Juries Meet Our Expectations?, 26 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 625, 625, 637 (2002) (arguing that the actual frequency of jury mistakes likely far
exceeds what the public would consider to be tolerable levels of error); Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating
the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 308 10 (2007) (explaining that
indica or of j r acc rac are q i e mode compared o ha one o ld ge b chance ); SAUL M.
KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 14 15 (Barbara A. Bodling ed., 1st ed. 1988) (highlighting some of the difficulties in
studying jury decision making); Fisher, supra note 27, at 578 79 ( There i li le e idence ha reg lar
people [jurors] do much better than chance at separating truth from lie . ).
217. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 188 89 (Harlan, J., di en ing) ( Un rained j ror are
pre mabl le adep a reaching acc ra e concl ion of fac han j dge . ); Fi her, supra note 27,
at 578 80.
218. Fisher, supra note 27, at 578.
219. See Blakel . Wa hing on, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) ( Ul ima el , o r deci ion canno rn
on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice. One
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Jury trials were important to the Framers because of the institutional
role they play in our structure of government.220 A criminal defendan
right to be tried by a jury acts as a check on national power and
government overreach.221 Tho e ho ro e o r con i ion kne from
history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too
responsive to the voice of higher authori . 222 Tha [f]ear of nchecked
power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects,
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community
par icipa ion in he de ermina ion of g il or innocence. 223
Juries are thus a r c ral an ido e o j dicial and legi la i e
action.224 Indeed, i i anachroni ic o ee j r rial a an i e of
individual right rather than (also, and more fundamentally) a question of
go ernmen r c re. 225 The j r rial righ
a de igned o g ard

can certainly argue that both these values would be better served by leaving justice entirely in the
hands of professionals; many nations of the world, particularly those following civil-law traditions,
ake j
ha co r e. There i no one hred of do b , ho e er, abo he Framer paradigm for
criminal justice: not the civil-law ideal of administrative perfection, but the common-law ideal of
limited state power accomplished by stric di i ion of a hori be een j dge and j r . ).
220. See Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2053 ( The framer a he j r a he mean for he ci i enr
to hold ultimate sway over the judicial function of government, in the same way power was given, by
mean of he ballo , o er he legi la i e and e ec i e f nc ion . (ci a ion omi ed)); Rachel E.
Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1015 (2006) ( E en
these protections [aimed at ensuring an independent judiciary] were inadequate to the Framers,
however. Although Article III judges are relatively more independent than Congress and the executive
branch, they are still part of the government. Because separation of powers is concerned, among other
things, with conflicts of interest, judges were not deemed sufficient protection against the possibility
of state abuse in criminal cases because of their potential partiality toward the government. The
Constitution therefore provides in Article III the Article establishing the judicial role in
government ha he rial of all crime m be b j r . The j r
nre ie able power to acquit
gives it the ability to check both the legislative and executive branches. And because federal juries
must be unanimous, all representative members of the community must agree before political actors
can impose criminal punishment. The jury, then, is a key component of the separation of powers in
he criminal la . (ci a ion omi ed)).
221. United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061,1087 (9th Cir. 2018) (Watford, J., dissenting).
222. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
223. Id.
224. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2055 (quoting Louis D. Bilionis, Criminal Justice After the
Conservative Reformation, 94 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1354 (2006)).
225. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 104 (1998). Jury trials also play an important role
in maintaining the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. By enabling public participation in the
conviction or acquittal of their fellow citizens, jury trials give the people a stake in enforcing criminal
law. And giving the public a stake in the process increases the perceptions of legitimacy of the
outcomes of that process. See generally AMAR, supra note 207 (discussing the role of the jury-trial
right in enhancing community support). See also Jenny Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L.
REV. 825, 829 30 (2015).
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again a piri of oppre ion and rann on he par of r ler , and a
from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country,
a he grea b l ark of heir ci il and poli ical liber ie . 226
The constitutional design of the jury trial is a clever one. Not only must
crimes be tried by juries, but those juries must be from the locality in
which the crimes were committed.227 And not only that, but a jury
acquittal is essentially unassailable.228
Those additional requirements that the jurors be local, that an
acquittal be final have little to do with preventing erroneous
conviction.229 But taken together, they have everything to do with
preventing government overreach.230 Viewed jointly and in context, those
pro ec ion allo j rie o communicat[e] messages to the legislature
regarding the wisdom of its laws, the judiciary regarding its sentencing
and process oversight, and the executive regarding its enforcement and
pro ec ion priori ie . 231 J rie ac a he oice of he comm ni ,
expressing moral judgment not only of the defendants who come before
226. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 11 (1995) (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540 41 (4th ed. 1873)); Mitchell,
supra note 147, a 1356 ( Al ho gh rial b j r er e man p rpo e for he j ror and he j ice
system, the primary rationale for jury trial has consistently been that it serves as a bulwark against
official rann . (ci a ion omi ed)).
227. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; see also Appleman, supra note 206,
at 416, 427 37 (discussing the historical importance of the locality requirement).
228. See AMAR, supra note 207, at 242; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
569 71 (1977).
229. Except in cases involving unique, difficult-to-understand local customs, there is little reason
to believe that local jurors would be significantly better at determining facts from evidence than jurors
from anywhere else in the nation. Rather, the requirement that juries be drawn from the local
population was aimed at mitigating the tyrannical application of centralized government power. See
Uni ed S a e . L nch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1087 (9 h Cir. 2018) (Wa ford, J., di en ing) ( To member
of he Fo nding genera ion i h fre h memorie of he coloni
experience under royal judges, the
j r independence from con rol b he j diciar pro ided a rance ha applica ion of na ional la
would rest in the hands of local citizens attuned to the concerns of their community, not in the hands
of officials beholden o a di an cen ral go ernmen . ). The Do ble Jeopard Cla e, U.S. CONST.
amend. V, may help prevent erroneous convictions, but that is not the primary harm it seeks to
prevent. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 88 (1957) ( [T]he S a e i h all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocen he ma be fo nd g il . ).
230. See Lynch, 903 F.3d a 1087 (Wa ford, J., di en ing) ( [T]he Framer of he Con i ion
incl ded o pro i ion ha ac a a check on he na ional go ernmen e erci e of po er in hi
realm: one a ing ha [ ]he Trial of all Crime , e cep in Ca e of Impeachmen , hall be b J r ;
he o her req iring ha
ch Trial hall be held in he S a e here he aid Crime hall ha e been
commi ed. (q o ing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3)).
231. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2054.

Yorke (Do Not Delete)

1474

10/5/2020 3:54 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:1441

them but also of the criminal laws under which those defendants
are prosecuted.232
The intersection of the jury trial right, the venue clause, and the
prohibition on double jeopardy creates a negative space in which juries
can operate by moral, rather than legal, imperatives.233 Only in that void,
which law cannot touch, can nullification occur. And history makes clear
that that void is not some unintentional quirk of our founding documents,
not an accidental black hole in the fabric of our constitutional universe,
but a purposeful construct designed to check government overreach.
Indeed, i i he j r
po er o n llif [ ha ] allo i o ac a he
con cience of he comm ni . 234 By acquitting in the teeth of the law
and the facts, juries communicate to the judiciary, legislature, and
e ec i e ha he cen ral go ernmen
cond c i o of ep i h
community norms.235 [W]hen ci i en on a j r acq i omeone de pi e
their legal guilt, the jurors make a potent statement about a particular
defendant or law, in the process transferring power from legislatures,
j dge , and pro ec or o a mall gro p of ci i en . 236 The power to
resist what the jury views as unjust laws and draconian sentences to
acquit or convict of a lesser offense when justice demands is a critical
and pedigreed aspect of the jury trial right.237
232. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059; see also Carroll, supra note 225, at 830 ( In heir delibera ion
and verdicts, they force the law out of the realm of the theoretical, into the space of their own lives.
Juries, and the citizens who comprise [them], become active participants in governance
commanding he la o re pond o he ci i en i ion a he ci izen seeks to conform to its strictures.
This role of the jury in creating law, though small in its empire of a single verdict, nonetheless serves
a critical democratic function grounding the law in the living world of the citizens whose obedience
it command . ).
233. See Carroll, supra note 33, a 662 ( The Con i ion g aran ee of a righ o a jury trial in
criminal ca e can al o be read a crea ing a for m o redefine he la i elf. ).
234. Lynch, 903 F.3d at 1087 88 (Watford, J., dissenting) (quoting JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE
JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 87 (1994)); see also United States v. Spock,
416 F.2d 165, 182 (1 Cir. 1969) ( [T]he j r , a he con cience of he comm ni , m be permitted
o look a more han logic. ); Rachel E. Barko , Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury s
Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 63 64 (2003)
( Injec ing he j r in o he affair of he j diciar and gi ing it a nullification power that the judge
does not possess gives the people a greater say on how criminal laws are applied . . . . Not only does
this curb the authority of the judges themselves, but it also provides a check on the legislature and
executive, which both serve broader constituencies that may not have the same interests as the jury
dra n from he comm ni . ).
235. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059 60.
236. Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 586 (2017).
237. See, e.g., Jone . Uni ed S a e , 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999) ( Thi po er o h ar Parliamen
and Crown took the form not only of flat-out acquittals in the face of guilt but of what today we would
call verdicts of guilty to lesser included offenses, manifestations of what Blackstone described as
pio perj r on he j ror par . (ci a ion omi ed)); Uni ed S a e . Ga din, 515 U.S. 506, 510
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Juries would not be an effective check on government if they could not
freely acquit.238 The power to return an acquittal contrary to fact and law
hen j ice o req ire i a he hear of j rie
r c ral hef . Were
juries stripped of that power, they could defend the community against
factually baseless charges, but they would be helpless in the face of unjust
laws or draconian sentences. Without the ability to nullify, juries would
be unable to meaningfully communicate to the government their moral
disapproval of the law.239 They would be forced to deliver convictions that
ran counter to community beliefs, forced to yield to centralized
government so long as the government had instilled its values in law,
ho e er rannical. For ha rea on, n llifica ion i an ancien a pec of
he j r preroga i e con ro er ial, e , b f ndamen al o he j r
structural importance.240
The jur
in i ional p rpo e i de ro ed hen a j dge hrea en a
jury with punishment for acquitting contrary to law or leads jurors to
belie e ha he lack he po er o do o. Indeed, [ ]hrea of p ni hmen
b er he j r
long anding role a a afeguard against government
oppre ion. 241 The rights at stake when that error occurs have little or
nothing to do with reaching the correct verdict under the law. Rather, they
have everything to do with ensuring that juries can fulfill their purpose in
our constitutional framework by reflecting regional values,
communicating disapproval of unjust laws, and acting as a check on
government power.242 The injury is an institutional one, separate and apart
from preventing the erroneous conviction of the particular defendant.243
(1995) ( The righ o ha e a j r make he l ima e de ermina ion of g il ha an impre i e
pedigree. ).
238. Barkow, supra note 220, a 1015 ( The j r
nre ie able po er o acq i gives it the ability
o check bo h he legi la i e and e ec i e branche . ).
239. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059 60; see also Carroll, supra note 33, a 662 ( So hen j ror
refuse to convict a defendant because they believe the law unjust (either generally or as applied), they
exercise their proper power and role to check the formal government and to give the law meaning
hro gh heir in erpre a ion. ).
240. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059 60; see also United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1087 (9th
Cir. 2018) (Wa ford, J., di en ing) ( One of he f ndamen al a rib e of rial by jury in our legal
system is the power of the jury to engage in nullification o re rn a erdic of no g il in he ee h
of bo h la and fac . (q o ing Horning . Di ric of Col mbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920))).
241. Lynch, 903 F.3d at 1088.
242. See Goldberg, supra note 131, a 430 ( [T]he al e in ci i en par icipa ion ma o eigh he
value of a decisionmaking system which makes more correct decisions. In the law generally, and in
criminal law particularly, the societal acceptability of the decision may be more important than its
correctness. Juries represent an institutional insurance policy for the continued acceptability of the
deci ionmaking
em. ).
243. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, America s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1760 n.58
(2011) (explaining that the jury trial right does not belong purely to the defendant but instead
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The institutional concerns here are very similar, if not identical, to those
at play when a trial court directs the jury to issue a verdict of guilty. The
Supreme Court has already said that a violation of the Sixth Amendment
arising out of a directed verdict can never be harmless, no matter how
rong he pro ec ion e idence of g il .244 The Court has acknowledged
that the j r
o erriding re pon ibili i o and be een he acc ed
and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Government that is in command of
he criminal anc ion. 245 For that reason, even when the evidence of guilt
is overwhelming, it matters from an institutional perspective whether
the judge or the jury actually decides the case.246 Accordingl , harmle error analysis presumably would not apply if a court directed a verdict for
he pro ec ion in a criminal rial b j r . 247
Similar concerns arise when a jury returns a guilty verdict after
receiving coercive instructions. When a judge intimates that the jury lacks
he freedom o acq i , he S a e canno con end ha he depri a ion a
harmle beca e he e idence e abli hed he defendan g il ; he error
in ch a ca e i ha he rong en i j dged he defendan g il . 248 An
error springing from a coerced verdict should be automatically reversible
for he ake of pro ec ing a ba ic righ , comple el di inc from an
concerns about erroneous conviction.249
In sum, the jury trial right at issue here is not, at its core, a truthfurthering right. Its primary purpose is not to protect defendants from
erroneous convictions; rather, its main purpose is institutional. To claim
that the jury trial right is designed to protect defendants from erroneous
conviction is to ignore the broader and more fundamental role that
juries and their inherent power to nullify play in the structure of
American governance. For that reason, coercive anti-nullification

implicates implicit rights held by the general public); State v. Moore, 179 Wash. App. 464, 468, 318
P.3d 296, 299 (2014) ( [T]he co r lack of remed again n llifica ion i no beca e he j r lack
ad
o phold he la . The co r doe no inq ire in o he j r
erdic o of re pec for o r
judicial system. (ci a ion omi ed)).
244. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986).
245. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977).
246. Rose, 478 U.S. at 578.
247. Id.; see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 294 (1991); Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 33 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248. Rose, 478 U.S. at 578; see also Neder, 527 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that an
error ari ing o of a direc ed erdic
o ld be per e reversible no matter how overwhelming the
nfa orable e idence (empha i omi ed)); S lli an . Lo i iana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993)
( [A]l ho gh a j dge ma direc a erdic for he defendan if he e idence i legall in fficien o
establish guilt, he ma no direc a erdic for he S a e, no ma er ho o er helming he e idence. ).
249. Neder, 527 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rose, 478 U.S. at 578.
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instructions satisfy the first of Weaver ra ionale for r c ral error.
B.

Difficulties with Measuring the Effects

Coercive anti-nullification instructions also satisfy Weaver
econd
rationale for structural error: the effects of such an error are very difficult
to measure.
Determining whether a constitutional error is harmless requires an
assessment of whether the error affected the verdict. A non-structural
con i ional error doe no req ire re er al of he con ic ion if he S a e
c[an] ho be ond a rea onable do b ha he error complained of did
no con rib e o he erdic ob ained. 250 In assessing the effect of the
error, he re ie ing co r con ider[ ] he na re of he iola ion and he
con e in hich i occ rred, aking in o acco n e eral fac or
depending on the type of violation at issue.251 Although the analysis is
multi-face ed, [ ]he reng h of he pro ec ion ca e i probabl he
ingle mo cri ical fac or. 252 Indeed, [c]a e ha ha e pheld
convictions rendered on incomplete or erroneous jury instructions have
relied on
rong and con incing e idence ha he pro ec ion ha
adeq a el pro ed [i ca e]. 253
Those standards are inapplicable here. Errors involving coercive antin llifica ion in r c ion def anal i for harmle ne
for a lea
three reasons.254
First, the possible effect of an improper anti-nullification instruction on

250. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 28 (1967)).
251. United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d
1162, 1167 68 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)
(explaining multi-factor harmless error analysis in the context of Confrontation Clause violations);
Neder, 527 U.S. at 17 ( In hi i a ion, here a re ie ing court concludes beyond a reasonable
doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that
the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found
to be harmless. We hink i be ond ca il here ha he error did no con rib e o he erdic
ob ained. (q o ing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24)); United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188,
1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the omission of an element of a crime from a jury instruction is
harmless when that element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence).
252. Reifler, 446 F.3d at 87; see also 3A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 854, at 305 (2d ed. 1982) ( Perhap he ingle mo ignifican fac or
in weighing whether an error was harmful, although not the only one, is the strength of the case against
he defendan . (foo no e omi ed)). Profe or M rra provides a detailed explanation of the way that
results-oriented harmless error analysis in other words, affirming when the evidence of guilt was
overwhelming persists despite courts semantic adherence to neutrally examining the effect of the
error on the verdict. Murray, supra note 110, at 1803 05.
253. United States v. Conti, 804 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2015).
254. United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061,1089 (9th Cir. 2018).
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the verdict cannot be assessed by any rubric that takes into account the
reng h of he pro ec ion ca e. Tha i o beca e of he niq e na re
of the nullification power. Given that nullification allows jurors to acquit
in the teeth of the law and the facts, nullification is salient precisely when
he go ernmen ca e i rong. Accordingl , he fac ha o er helming
evidence supported a conviction should not suggest that an erroneous antinullification instruction had no effect on the verdict.255
Indeed, foc ing on he reng h of he go ernmen
ca e in he
harmless error analysis leads to circular reasoning and perverse results in
the context of coercive anti-n llifica ion in r c ion . The Nin h Circ i
decision in Kleinman provides a perfect example.256 There, the court
considered whether an improper anti-nullification instruction affected the
guilty verdict that the jury ultimately delivered.257 The court began with
the premise that the instruction was unconstitutionally coercive.258 But
because the jury had no right to nullify and ample evidence supported
its finding of guilt the court concluded that the error was harmless.259
The court reasoned that the instruction:
[W]as only coercive insofar as it implied recrimination in the
event a verdict was reached contrary to the law. Because the
Government has shown that the verdict was reached in a manner
consistent with the law, we are confident that the instruction had
no effec on he j r
erdic . The erdic o ld ha e been he
same absent the di ric co r error, beca e he e idence of
Kleinman g il
o ld ha e been he ame, he j dge
instructions on the law would have been the same, and the jury
would have had no more right to reach a nullifying verdict than it
did here.260
The circ lari of he co r reasoning highlights the difficulty with
applying harmless error review in this context. Because the evidence of
guilt was overwhelming and the jury was correctly instructed on the
255. To the contrary (and perhaps counterintuitively), a coercive anti-nullification instruction may
be more likely to have affected the verdict when the evidence against a defendant was strong. That is
so because, under those circumstances, jurors could have only returned an acquittal by nullifying
rather than by resolving disputed facts in the defendant s favor.
256. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2017).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.; see also id. a 1034 ( The error did no lea e
i h no objec , o o peak, pon hich
harmle error cr in can opera e, ince e ill ha e a proper j r erdic and ma de ermine
he her he n llifica ion in r c ion pla ed an ignifican role in he j r
finding of guilt beyond
a rea onable do b . (ci a ion omi ed)).
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substantive law (aside from the anti-nullification instruction), the court
assumed that the jury would have reached the same verdict regardless of
the error.261 But the point of prohibiting directed verdicts and punishment
of jurors as well as instructions suggesting the same is that the court
must leave room for the jury to deliver a verdict contrary to the law.
Asking whether the verdict actually delivered was supported by the
evidence in other words, within the law is beside the point.262 The
Kleinman co r rea oning h render error re l ing from coercive
anti-nullification instructions not just subject to harmless error review but,
in fact, per se harmless.
Imagine that the court had actually threatened the jurors with jail or had
simply directed the jury to issue a guilty verdict. The harmlessness
analysis the Kleinman court undertook would be essentially unaltered.
After all, he e idence of Kleinman g ilt would have been the same,
he j dge in r c ion on he la
o ld ha e been he ame, and he j r
would have had no more right to reach a nullifying verdict than it did
here. 263 Strictly applying the principles articulated in Kleinman, the
conviction would likely be affirmed.264 But it cannot be that such an
error which runs contrary to some of our most foundational principles
would be without remedy.265
Viewed another way, the improper instructions shifted the locus of
decision making from the jury to the judge. The effect of that error is
likewise very difficult to measure, and it cannot be determined from
e amining he reng h of he pro ec ion ca e. Like depri a ion of he
261. See Murray, supra note 110, a 1820 ( [R]e l -based harmless error review bears the potential
to systematically deprive redress for result-independent, non-truth-furthering interests in cases where
the evidence of guil i o er helming. ).
262. As Judge Watford put it in his dissent in Lynch, [ ]he harmle ne inq ir in hi con e
can
rn on an e al a ion of he reng h of he go ernmen e idence; b definition, nullification
in ol e a j ror deci ion o acq i no i h anding he reng h of he e idence. Uni ed S a e .
Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1089 (9th Cir. 2018).
263. Kleinman, 880 F.3d at 1034.
264. I am close to giving Kleinman short shrift here in the interest of making a point. It is possible
that the severity of the improper threat or its repetition might have convinced the Kleinman court to
reverse under these circumstances. The court did take into account that the instructions at issue in that
case were not emphasized and were only a small part of the final instructions. Id. But a bulk of the
court s analysis focused on the fact that the jury correctly understood the substantive law, and the
evidence of guilt was substantial, and that fundamentally jurors had no right to return a verdict
contrary to law. Id. Those aspects of the analysis would apply equally no matter how grievous the
error.
265. Indeed, we already know that a directed guilty verdict should result in automatic reversal
without regard for the strength of the prosecution s case. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986). To
the extent that an instruction is coercive enough to deprive the jury of a meaningful opportunity to
acquit, automatic reversal should similarly be required.
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right to counsel of choice, the effect of shifting decisional power from the
j dge o he j r i en irel nrela ed o he reng h of he pro ec ion
case and impossible to measure with any certainty.266 Harmle -error
analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry into what might
have occurred in an alternate universe. 267
The unique nature of the error here thus renders irrelevant the strength
of he go ernmen ca e. A emp ing o appl radi ional harmle ne
analysis, in which that factor is dominant, leads us down a nonsensical
path. And the fact this error fits so poorly into traditional methods of
harmlessness analysis suggests that it is not amenable to harmless
error review.
Second, even if we presume that a court could conduct some kind of
harmle ne re ie ha e ci ed he reng h of he pro ec ion ca e
from consideration,268 the effects of this particular type of error would
nonetheless remain difficult to measure.269 If nullification is a worrisome
enough possibility such as in federal prosecutions where the conduct at
issue is legal under state law that the court feels compelled to issue
coercive anti-nullification instructions, it seems unlikely that the
government would be able to prove that such an instruction had no effect
on the verdict without relying on the strength of its case to do so.270 Given
that juries return general verdicts and that their deliberations occur within
a black box, it would seem impossible to assess what effect a coercive
anti-nullification instruction had on the verdict.271 Could the government
266. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (noting that because the effect
of deprivation of choice of counsel cannot be measured, it qualifies as structural error).
267. Id.
268. This is a questionable proposition. See Daniel J. Kornstein, A Bayesian Model of Harmless
Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 135, 143 (1976) (noting that the harmless error analysis assesses the
b for effec of he error, nder hich he probabili of g il gi en he [ n ain ed]
evidence[] . . . i ab ol el nece ar o arri e a an in elligen concl ion regarding he error effec
on he erdic (ci ing Harring on . California, 395 U.S. 250, 256 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
269. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) ( [T]he j r g aran ee being a ba ic
pro ec io[n] ho e preci e effec are nmea rable, b
i hout which a criminal trial cannot
reliabl er e i f nc ion. (foo no e omi ed)); Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150 (finding an error
i h con eq ence ha are nece aril nq an ifiable and inde ermina e[] nq e ionabl q alifie
a r c ral error (quoting Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 282)).
270. United States v. Lynch, 903 F.3d 1061, 1089 (9th Cir. 2018).
271. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (effect of discrimination in choosing the
grand j r co ld no be mea red, in par beca e he j r delibera ion and mo i a ion are hidden
from re ie ); Alli on Orr Lar en, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1572 73
(2011) ( Perhap he defining fea re of a j r delibera ion i ha i ake place in ecre : a e of
strangers are charged with assigning criminal liability to an individual, are told that they can keep
their discussions private, and are not required to provide reasons for their final judgment. Courts are
adaman abo pro ec ing he m er and ecrec of he black bo ; j r di c ion are among he
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establish harmlessness by showing that support for the state law was a
mere 51%, or that the particular jurors in the case voted against the state
law, or that the jurors themselves were generally rule-following and lawabiding and therefore unlikely to nullify? Probably not. Most of that
information would be outside the appellate record, not to mention
patently inappropriate.272
Which brings us to the third problem with measuring the effects of
improper nullification instructions: doing so would force courts to wade
into troubled and decidedly unjudicial waters. An error of this type would
be reversible only if there was a fair chance that the jurors would have
disregarded the law absent the erroneous instruction. Assessing
harmlessness in this context would thus require courts to assess how much
a particular community disagreed with the governing law and how likely
members of that community were to disregard the law. Answering those
questions would not only be difficult and murky, it would also require
irring p a poli ical and ocial horne
nest. And perhaps most
importantly, it would turn basic principles of judicial review on
their heads.
Courts generally assume that jurors follow their instructions.273 They
also generally assume absent something like a constitutional
challenge that the laws they enforce are valid ones.274 But assessing
harmlessness in this context would require the court to toss those
presumptions aside to consider the validity and prevalence of policy
objections to the law, the level of public respect for government and
mo pri a e and pri ileged in o r legal
em. (ci a ion omi ed)); see also FED. R. EVID. 606
(generally precluding jurors from revealing the content of their deliberations).
272. Assuming that the state could not rely on such information nor on the strength of its case, it
would be nearly impossible for the government to demonstrate harmlessness when the law under
which the defendant was prosecuted was unpopular. See Lynch, 903 F.3d a 1089 ( A lea in ca e
like this one, where nullification was an obvious possibility given the popularity of medical marijuana
in California, I don ee ho he go ernmen co ld e er pro e ha a co r
nd l coerci e an in llifica ion in r c ion had no effec on he o come. ). Accordingly, in such situations, these errors
would become per se harmful in practice a roundabout and less rigorous way of arriving at an
automatic reversal rule.
273. See, e.g., Richard on . Mar h, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) ( The r le ha j rie are pre med
to follow their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in the absolute certitude that the
presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the
interests of the state and the defendant in the criminal jus ice proce . ); Franci . Franklin, 471 U.S.
307, 325 n.9 (1985) ( [W]e adhere o he cr cial a mp ion nderl ing o r con i ional
em of
rial b j r ha j ror caref ll follo in r c ion . ).
274. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ( The general r le
i ha legi la ion i pre med o be alid. ). Co r al o a oid poli ical q e ion . See Zivotofsky ex
rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 96 (2012). Although that doctrine is not strictly
implicated here, its pragmatic foundation is relevant.
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procli i for follo ing j dge in r c ion , and he likel p chological
effects of being charged with enforcing a law with which one disagrees or
threatened with punishment for disregarding it.275 It is difficult to see how
appellate courts could engage in internally consistent reasoning if, in this
particular context, they were forced to disregard some of their most
fundamental assumptions.276
Courts are intellectually and analytically capable bodies, so it is
possible that they could undertake this analysis. But even if they could,
should they? Doing so would require detailed inquiry into sensitive and
nebulous subjects in which courts are not experts, including in-depth
discussion and assessment of public opposition to particular laws. Given
he j ror pri acy interests and the zealousness with which courts and
legislatures have guarded the secrecy of juror deliberations,277 the analysis
would necessarily be broadly statistical and probabilistic (perhaps based
on legislative history and judicially noticeable documents establishing the
popularity of relevant laws). But this type of reasoning is precisely the
kind that courts have tried to avoid when determining whether to uphold
the conviction of a particular individual.278 And opining on whether jurors
in a particular state would have been likely to disregard a federal law
might give the rather improper appearance that the court itself either
approves or disapproves of the law at issue.279
275. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (stating that where assessing
the effect of the error requires speculative and nebulous inquiry, harmless error analysis is untenable).
276. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 5 SUP. CT.
REV. 195, 206 07 (1989) ( [C]o r , par ic larl appella e co r , pre me a ra ional j r ha ill
act in accordance with the instructions given it. . . . [I]t is difficnlt [sic] to see how any other premise
could be employed in a systematic way a a ba i for j dicial rea oning. (ci a ion omi ed)); J rek
. Te a , 428 U.S. 262, 279 (1976) (Whi e, J., conc rring) ( [I] ho ld no be a med ha j rie
ill di obe or n llif heir in r c ion . ).
277. See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent
Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 835 (1998) ( [W]hen i come o j r erdic , e canno do he
equivalent of throwing open the hood and looking at the engine, because we are deeply committed to
he ecrec of j r delibera ion . ).
278. See Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and
Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1050 (1988);
Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1378 (1985); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 10, a 133 ( [A] co r ho ld no
uphold a conviction or conclude that a defendant has not shown the requisite level of outcomeinfl encing prej dice hen he co r j dgmen i ba ed on i o n probabili ic impre ion of ha
a j r ac all did or ha a h po he ical rea onable j r i likel o do. ); see also Howard v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 358, 360 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529,
532 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1980).
279. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ( [J] ice m
a i f he appearance of
j ice. ); Sa l M. Ka in, The American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 687, 687 (1990); KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 216, at 13 14; Erin York Cornwell,
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Moreover, to the extent that we agree that jury nullification is lawless
behavior,280 we cannot expect appellate courts, trained so rigorously in the
dialectic of law, to dive headfirst into that lawlessness. Indeed, the duality
of nullification anarchic and institutional, merciful and prejudiced is
likely part of the reason appellate courts have been so reluctant to talk
about it even as a general matter or to allow trial courts to discuss it with
jurors. Asking courts to pinpoint the probability of nullification in any
given case, and the likelihood that particular instructions prevented it,
would force courts to engage in analysis that is antithetical to the basic
ene of j dicial deci ion making. And pplan ing he appella e co r
moral (rather than legal) judgment for a decision the jury should have
freely made would not allevia e he harm done o he j r
in i ional
role.281 Appellate courts are thus uniquely ill-suited to assess harmlessness
in this context.
In sum, the effect of error arising out of coercive anti-nullification is
impossible to measure with any certainty. Even attempting to do so leads
to circular reasoning and speculation. Accordingly, error arising out of
coercive anti-nullification instructions also satisfies Weaver
econd
rationale for structural error.
C.

Fundamental Unfairness

Finally, coercive anti-nullification instructions satisfy the third Weaver
rationale for structural error.282 Because this type of error always results
in fundamental unfairness, it qualifies as structural error of the
highest order.
Coercive anti-nullification instructions implicate one of the
fundamental aspects of our criminal justice system and one of the basic
principles upon which the Framers most strongly insisted. As Alexander
Hamilton put it:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they

Opening and Closing the Jury Room Door: A Sociohistorical Consideration of the 1955 Chicago Jury
Project Scandal, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 49, 59 60, 67 69 (2010); see also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S.
107, 125 (1987).
280. Compare Uni ed S a e . Pere , 86 F.3d 735, 736 (7 h Cir. 1996) ( An nrea onable j r
verdict, although unreviewable if it is an acquittal, is lawless, and the defendant has no right to invite
he j r o ac la le l . ), with Brown, supra note 16, at 1150 (discussing the ways in which
nullification can be considered to occur within the parameters of the rule of law).
281. See Fairfax, supra note 10, a 2031 ( [I]f he j r i o re ain an emblance of i in ended
constitutional function, appellate courts must respect the institutional interests of the jury, which
canno be f r her bordina ed o he pragma ic al e he harmle error r le ad ance . ).
282. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017).
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agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon
the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it
consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to
liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free
government.283
Trial by a jury stripped of the power to freely acquit eviscerates some
of the central purposes of the jury trial right itself to act as a check on a
distant government and to speak as the moral voice of the community. 284
When a judge instructs the jury that it may be punished if it disregards the
law or that a verdict resulting from such disregard would be invalid, the
balance of power in adjudicating guilt improperly shifts from the jury to
the judge.285 Indeed, the mere act of providing such a forceful
instruction although ostensibly result-neutral in fact may suggest that
the judge believes the legally correct result is conviction and that an
acquittal will necessarily imply juror misconduct. Any time such an
instruction is relevant, the context will probably make clear to the jurors
that the judge is warning them against acquitting despite
overwhelming evidence.
J ror are likel o ake ch arning erio l . Indeed, [ ]he
influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great
eigh , and j ror are e er a chf l of he ord ha fall from him.
Par ic larl in a criminal rial, he j dge la
ord i ap o be he
286
deci i e ord.
Moreover, jurors who are threatened with punishment
acquire a perceived personal stake in the outcome of the case because an
acquittal against the law could, according to the judge, result in personal
consequences. That perceived personal stake in the outcome further
ndermine he j r
independence and di or he ba ic frame ork of
the trial.287
283. THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 521 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961); see also Fairfax, supra note 10, a 2073 ( No con i ional al e i more f ndamen al han
he frame ork of go ernmen ha hel er he poli ical and ci il righ
e hold o dearl . The j r
institutional role in that structure must be jealously guarded, lest our desire for efficiency overshadow
o r need for liber . ).
284. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2059.
285. See Neder . Uni ed S a e , 527 U.S. 1, 39 (1999) (Scalia, J., di en ing) ( Wha co ld po ibl
be so bad about having judges decide that a jury would necessarily have found the defendant guilty?
Nothing except the distrust of judges that underlies the jury- rial g aran ee. (empha i in original)).
286. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946) (citation omitted).
287. See United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) ( When con i ional error call in o q e ion he objec i i of ho e
charged with bringing a defendant to judgment, a reviewing court can neither indulge a presumption
of reg lari nor e al a e he re l ing harm. ); T rner . Lo i iana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 72 (1965)
( In e ence, he righ o j r rial g aran ee o he criminall acc ed a fair rial b a panel of
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The problem with this type of error and with directed verdicts as
well is less about unfairness to any particular defendant and more about
the damage wrought to the institution.288 The cornerstone of trial by jury
is that the jury truly be the ultimate arbiter of culpability and that it engage
in that task with a sense of independence.289 Juries who instead labor in
fear, threatened with possible punishment based on the verdict they return,
are not fulfilling their institutional role.290 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has
observed that:
[j]urors cannot fairly determine the outcome of a case if they
belie e he
ill face ro ble for a concl ion he reach a
jurors. The threat of punishment works a coercive influence on
he j r
independence, and a j ror ho genuinely fears
retribution might change his or her determination of the issue for
fear of being punished.291
Errors resulting from instructions that instill fear or a sense of futility
in j ror a o heir choice of erdic h
go o he er e ence of the
j r
iden i and f nc ion. 292 [W]hen j rie differ i h he re l a
which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving
some of the very purposes for which they were created and for which they
are no emplo ed. 293 Coercing jurie o abandon heir abili o find a
erdic of g il or no g il a heir o n con cience ma direc
intrudes upon one of the most important aspects of the jury trial right.294
Deeming such an error harmless would therefore undermine the
fundamental institutional interests protected by Article III and the
Sixth Amendment.
It might seem odd when discussing fundamental fairness to focus on

impar ial, indifferen j ror . The fail re o accord an acc ed a fair hearing iola e e en he minimal
standards of due proce . (q o ing Ir in . Do d, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961))).
288. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986) (explaining that an error resulting from a directed
verdict in favor of the prosecution would not be subject to review for harmlessness because the
reng h of he pro ec ion ca e i imma erial hen he rong en ity has judged the defendant
guilty).
289. See Uni ed S a e . Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1 Cir. 1969) ( The con i ional g aran ee
of due process and trial by jury require that a criminal defendant be afforded the full protection of a
j r nfe ered, direc l or indirec l . ).
290. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d at 950.
291. Id.
292. Fairfax, supra note 10, at 2066; see also id. a 2060 ( When an ninformed or mi informed
jury returns a verdict of guilty, it is not only the criminal defendant who suffers harm (whether or not
he appella e co r belie e
ch defendan ha been prej diced), b he j r i elf. ).
293. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968).
294. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 513 15 (1995) (citation omitted).
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institutional concerns instead of concerns relating to the particular
defendant or to criminal defendants more generally. But that focus is in
keeping with the modern jurisprudential trend towards recognizing the
jury trial right as a collective or institutional right rather than as an
individual one a rend ha re rn o he Framer original ie on he
subject.295 In cases like Apprendi v. New Jersey296 and Jones v. United
States,297 the Court has emphasized the importance of the jury trial right
from an institutional perspective and recognized the broader injury that
intrinsically results from violations of that right.298 Th , in modern ime
the Court has indicated that the boundaries of the right to a jury trial
ho ld be con r c ed aro nd con idera ion of he j r
p rpo e. Thi
ne er, f nc ionali concep ion of he j r role i more compa ible i h
nullification. 299
Accordingly, the issue here is not that a coercive anti-nullification
in r c ion depri e he defendan of ome ab rac en i lemen o he
l ck of a la le deci ionmaker. 300 Were that the crux of the matter, it
would be difficult or impossible to argue that trial by a jury stripped of the

295. As Akhil Amar explains,
In he en ie h cen r , he S preme Co r began o di regard he plain meaning of hall and
all in he Ar icle III jury-and-venue clause, treating the issue as merely one concerning the
waivable righ of he criminal defendan . B he Fo nder j r -and-venue rules had deeper
roots. Trials were not just about the rights of the defendant but also about the rights of the
community.
AMAR, supra note 207, at 236 37; see also APPLEMAN, supra note 41, a 15 ( [R]e rning o hi orical
origins eache
ha he righ o a j r rial i gro nded in he comm ni
cen ral role of deciding
p ni hmen for criminal offender and in i abili o de ermine moral blame or hine . ). For an
interesting perspective positing that the jury trial right should be interpreted not as the Framers saw it
but as it was understood during the Reconstruction era, see Bressler, supra note 19.
296. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
297. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
298. Id. at 245; Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466; see Appleman, supra note 206, at 400; Fairfax, supra note
10, at 2055 56; see also Carroll, supra note 33, at 659; Louis D. Bilionis, Criminal Justice After the
Conservative Reformation, 94 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1354 (2006) ( The recen ca e , f r hermore, end o
focus on justice as perceived from the perspective of our institutions and the public that has some
moral stake in their operation, rather than from the perspective of the criminally accused individual.
The Apprendi line of opinion , for in ance, re e he j r
hi orical impor ance a a r c ral
antidote to judicial power rather than the value of lay decisionmaking as a bulwark of liberty for
indi id al . The empha i i on he
em e plici and implici pro e a ion and he percep ion
of legi imac ha follo . ).
299. Arie M. Rubenstein, Note, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern Jury Trial,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 975 77 (2006); see also Robert E. Korroch & Michael J. Davidson, Jury
Nullification: A Call for Justice or an Invitation to Anarchy?, 139 MIL. L. REV. 131, 137 (1993).
300. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 95 (1984) (discussing the prejudice
determination in the context of reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding).
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right to nullify always results in fundamental unfairness.301 Rather, the
fundamental unfairness results from the damage wrought to the institution
and o he p blic collec i e righ o rial b a j r nfe ered. 302 That
damage results each and every time this particular error occurs, suggesting
that fundamental unfairness to our institutions, to the public always
results from coercive anti-nullification instructions.303 This error therefore
also satisfies Weaver hird ra ionale for r c ral error.
IV. SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
Given that several courts have treated coercive anti-nullification
instructions as amenable to harmless error review, reasonable minds can
disagree about whether such instructions constitute structural error.
Reasons for disagreement likely span both analytical and pragmatic
objections. I briefly explore some of those possible objections here.
A.

Analytical Objections

Perhaps the most obvious analytical objection to categorizing coercive
anti-nullification instructions as structural error goes something like this:
Courts across the country have made clear that a defendant has no right to
nullification. Automatic reversal should be for only the most profound
errors, so why should it apply here, where the error has cost the defendant
only the possibility of an acquittal by nullification, to which he had no
right in the first place?
Certainly that argument has some intuitive appeal, and it seems to have
gained traction in the courts. For example, this view runs throughout the
Nin h Circ i opinion in Kleinman. In determining that errors of this
type do not result in fundamental unfairness, the court observed that
Kleinman has no constitutional right to jury nullification, in contrast to
indigent defendants who have a right to an attorney, and all defendants
who have a right to be convicted only upon a finding of guilt beyond a

301. Numerous courts have emphasized that a defendant is not entitled to any such luck. See id. at
695.
302. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969); see also United States v. Dougherty,
473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Ba elon, J., di en ing) ( The er e ence of he j r
function is its role as spokesman for the community conscience in determining whether or not blame
can be impo ed. ).
303. See Fairfax, supra note 10, a 2051 ( [T]he j r ha epara e and distinct institutional interests.
Among he e are he main enance of he j r
r c ral role in go ernmen and i f nc ion a he
voice of the community. Injuries to these institutional interests remain, regardless of whether the
individual criminal defendan i deemed o ha e been prej diced. ).
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rea onable do b . 304 The overall tenor of the opinion was that the error
implicated such a dubious power that it simply could not be important
enough to warrant automatic reversal.305
B foc ing on he ab ence of a defendan righ o n llifica ion
overlooks the fact that the Sixth Amendment nonetheless guarantees a
decision by an independent jury. When a jury instruction is so coercive
that it deprives the jury of the right to freely decide whether to acquit, then
the defendant cannot be said to have received trial by an independent
jury and can barely be said to have received a trial by jury at all. The
difficulty inheres in trying to distinguish instructions that properly inform
juries that they should follow the law from those that are impermissibly
coercive. When an instruction does in fact cross the line into coercion,
ho e er, i nece aril in r de on he j r
ole phere of a hori . And
the harm that results from that intrusion implicates one of our most
fundamental protections against tyrannical government.
I i al o or h remembering ha
r c ral error i no non mo
i h mo egregio error. In ead, r c ral error def harmle ne
review for one of the reasons articulated in Weaver.306 But calling
something structural error does not mean the right at issue is the most
critical or that its denial always results in a miscarriage of justice.307 For
example, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,308 the Supreme Court had
li le ro ble concl ding ha he erroneo depri a ion of co n el of
choice qualified as structural error.309 It did not matter whether the counsel
defendant did receive conducted the trial admirably.310 Nor did it matter
that the right itself was subject to exceptions, inapplicable to indigent
defendan , and empered b he rial co r
ide di cre ion in balancing
311
fairness and efficiency concerns. Once the right was violated, the
critical point was that the effect of the error was impossible to measure
that was all that was required for the error to qualify as structural.312
This objection regarding the dubious status of nullification is therefore
aimed less at challenging the idea that coercive instructions amount to
304. United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1034 (9th Cir. 2017).
305. Id. at 1033 35.
306. Weaver v. Massachusetts, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1908 (2017).
307. Id. ( An error can co n a r c ral e en if he error doe no lead o f ndamen al nfairne
in e er ca e. ).
308. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
309. Id. at 150.
310. Id. at 150 51.
311. Id. at 151 52.
312. Id. at 150.
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structural error than it is at challenging the idea that such instructions
amount to constitutional error at all. Certainly, there is room for
disagreement about which instructions are coercive enough to qualify as
error.313 A ome poin , ho gh, in r c ion ha in r de on a j r po er
to acquit against the evidence must cross the constitutional line. Were that
not so, there might be a decent argument that the Constitution does not
actually prohibit directed guilty verdicts (or, at least, that such errors
might be harmless).314 Yet no one, I suspect, believes that a court should
be able to direct a guilty verdict or punish jurors for returning an acquittal,
or that an appellate court should affirm the resulting verdict.
Assuming that truly coercive anti-nullification instructions do amount
to constitutional error, the question reduces to whether such errors are
amenable to harmless error analysis. The difficulties inherent in
attempting to apply a harmlessness rubric in this context suggest to me
that the error is a structural one. Moreover, it is troubling that this error
could have a constitutional dimension but by operation of a
harmle ne anal i ha foc e on he reng h of he pro ec ion
case and presumes that jurors mechanically apply the law uniformly
lack a remedy as a practical matter.
Some might also question why automatic reversal is appropriate when
no one doubts that the defendant is guilty. The answer, in short, is that the
reversal of the conviction serves purposes other than those related to the
particular defendant. Indeed, it is precisely because the violation at issue
i o nrela ed o he defendan in ere in a oiding erroneo con ic ion
that automatic reversal is particularly appropriate here. Like the publictrial right, the right at issue here primarily serves interests unrelated to
erroneous conviction, but the defendant is the one who can vindicate
that right.315
Requiring automatic reversal under these circumstances would likely
discourage trial courts from suggesting to jurors that they lacked powers
they in fact possess. It could also help to ensure that juries decide cases
freel , no nder hrea of p ni hmen if he reach he
rong re l .
And it would vindicate the basic structural safeguards in Article III and
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution, emphasizing the jury
313. Compare United States v. Kleinman, 880 F.3d 1020, 1033 (9th Cir. 2017), with United States
v. Krzyske, 836 F.2d 1013, 1021 (6th Cir. 1988). See also discussion supra section I.B.2.
314. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993) ( The Si h Amendmen req ire more
than appella e pec la ion abo a h po he ical j r
ac ion, or el e direc ed erdic for he S a e
would be sustainable on appeal . . . . ); Neder . Uni ed S a e , 527 U.S. 1, 33 34 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
315. See Shepard, supra note 152, at 1207 08 (explaining that the public-trial right serves the
di inc al e of ran parenc and ha li le or no hing o do i h [ he rial ] reliabili or i
f ndamen al fairne ); Waller . Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984).
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rial righ role in en ring ha he go ernmen canno crea e and enforce
criminal law without feedback from local communities.
B.

Public Policy Objections

In addition to the analytical objections discussed above, some may see
problematic pragmatic consequences to deeming coercive antinullification instructions automatically reversible error. I anticipate two
primary objections of this sort, which represent different sides of the
same coin.
First, some may fear that classifying coercive anti-nullification
instructions as structural error will increase incidents of nullification and
decrease perceptions of fairness and public confidence in the criminal
justice system. In cases in which a coercive anti-nullification instruction
seems necessary albeit constitutionally problematic it is likely that the
government has presented overwhelming evidence of guilt. Requiring
automatic reversal in those cases might appear particularly unfair, given
that those defendants are perhaps among the most clearly guilty of the
crimes with which they have been charged.
Moreover, requiring automatic reversal for improper nullification
instructions might discourage trial courts from providing juries with even
gentle admonitions to follow the law. Wishing to avoid automatic
reversal, courts may be even more hush-hush about the subject, confusing
juries and perhaps increasing the incidence of nullification. To the extent
ha n llifica ion i ie ed a anarchic, ing rial co r
hand in
discouraging that practice may leave some unsettled. While nullification
can serve merciful and just purposes, it can also exacerbate and perpetuate
prejudices. And frequent nullification might actually impede reformation
of unjust laws by mitigating their effects, thus preventing popular outrage
that might be best expressed at the ballot box. Most problematically, some
may worry that increased nullification might undermine the rule of law.
Second, and on the flip side, classifying coercive anti-nullification
instructions as structural error might counterintuitively decrease the
likelihood that appellate courts will find such instructions to be erroneous
at all. Because appellate courts will know that this type of error
automatically results in reversal, they may be less likely to deem
instructions that approach the line to be erroneous, thereby shifting the
line itself to allow a greater range of anti-nullification instructions. To the
extent that one believes that juries should be insulated from instructions
that misstate their power or threaten them with punishment based on the
verdict they return, there is an argument to be made that classifying this

Yorke (Do Not Delete)

2020]

10/5/2020 3:54 PM

JURY NULLIFICATION AND STRUCTURAL ERROR

1491

type of error as structural would actually impede that goal.316
Both of these objections are interesting but somewhat beyond the scope
of this Article. Moreover, given that true nullification distinguished
from cases involving ambiguous facts appears to be rare, classifying
coercive anti-nullification instructional errors as structural likely would
not affect the outcome in a large number of cases. It would, however,
serve important institutional purposes. Classifying these errors as
structural comports with Supreme Court case law and prevents appellate
courts from engaging in a harmlessness analysis that makes little sense
and fails to serve the purpose of the underlying right. In doing so, it
pro ec he in egri of he
em and indica e he j r f ndamen al
power to speak for the community.
CONCLUSION
To the extent that federal and state laws increasingly diverge or that
punishments for certain crimes outpace community sensibilities,
questions surrounding jury nullification and what can be said about it
may become more salient.317 When a court instructs the jury that it lacks
the power to acquit or may be punished for doing so, the court eviscerates
some of the essential purposes of trial by jury. Because that error defies
analysis for harmlessness, it should result in automatic reversal.

316. We should hesitate to tolerate constitutional error out of a concern that correcting the error
might lead courts to adjust their analyses to reach the same practical outcome. That approach
disregards the importance of the constitutional issues and assumes that courts will engage in resultsoriented politicking.
317. See Barkow, supra note 220, at 1017 (explaining that the nature of constitutional checks and
balances, incl ding he j r rial righ and he j r po er o acq i , pro ide ample e idence ha
the potential growth and abuse of federal criminal power was anticipated by the Framers and that they
intended to place limits on it through the separation of po er ).
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